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The Uncertain Miranda Fuel Doctrine
LEE M. MODJESKA*
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held in the recent
trilogy of Handy Andy, Inc.,' Bell & Howell Co.,2 and Murcel Manu-
facturing Corp.,3 that the Constitution did not require and the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)4 did not permit the Board to withhold
certifications or bargaining orders from unions that practice racial
or other invidious discrimination.5 Instead, the Board announced that
issues involving alleged invidious discrimination by unions are to be
resolved in unfair labor practice proceedings under the Board's
Miranda Fuel Co. doctrine of the duty of fair representation.6 The
Board stated in Handy Andy that "[lthe duty of fair representation
has become the touchstone of the Board's concern with invidious
discrimination by unions."7 It is now fifteen years since the Board
announced the "novel, if not quite revolutionary theory"8 that the
breach by a union of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor
practice under.section 8 of the NLRA.9 By a steady expansion of the
Miranda Fuel doctrine since that time, the Board has embarked upon
a course of ever-increasing review and regulation of areas of union
conduct previously free from Board involvement.
The Board's doctrine was rejected by the Second Circuit in
Miranda Fuel enforcement proceedings. Indeed, it has been specifi-
cally endorsed by only a few courts and endorsed without critical
analysis by only a few others, and has not yet received approval from
the Supreme Court. It has, moreover, been the subject of numerous
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1. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354 (1977).
2. 230 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 95 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1977).
3. 231 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 18,493 (NLRB 1977). See also
Plumbers Local 393, 232 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (1977) (concerning a § 10(k) jurisdictional dispute
work award).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-168, 171-182, 185-187 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
5. In so holding, the Board overruled its holding in Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211
N.L.R.B. 138 (1974), that it lacked the constitutional power to confer certification on a union
engaging in discriminatory practices. See NLRB v. Mansion House Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th
Cir. 1973), in which the court held that the Board was precluded by the fifth amendment from
issuing a bargaining order in favor of a union that practices racial discrimination; Modjeska,
The NLRB 1977: Significant Decisions of the Board and General Counsel, 103 MID%,TS
LAB. L. CONF. 2.01, 2.01-2.05 (Ohio Legal Center Institute 1977).
6. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963).
7. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1362.
8. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 1963).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
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split Board decisions. The new chairman of the Board, Chairman
Fanning, dissented in Miranda Fuel and has consistently expressed his
disagreement with the doctrine.'0 With this background, and in light
of the vigorous reaffirmation given Miranda Fuel by the Board in
Handy Andy, Bell & Howell, and Murcel it seems appropriate at this
point to re-examine the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine and
review the course that the Board has taken. I" This article sum-
marizes the judicial background of the fair representation doctrine
prior to Miranda Fuel, analyzes the Miranda Fuel decision itself, sum-
marizes the more significant applications of the doctrine by the Board,
and examines the statutory bases for the doctrine as defined and ap-
plied by the Board and as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The
unavoidable conclusion emerging from this analysis is that the Board
lacks an appropriate congressional charter for the course it has taken.
This course also appears to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the unfair labor practice provisions upon which the
doctrine is based. Thus, the doctrine rests upon the most uncertain
of foundations.
I. THE Miranda Fuel DOCTRINE
The doctrine attributed to Miranda Fuel is that breach of a union's
duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice. The Board
seems to feel that such a breach occurs, stated simply, when the union
treats an employee unfairly. An analysis of the underlying statutory
framework and the doctrine's emergence as a major principle of labor
law will be examined in the following sections.
A. The Statutory Framework
The NLRB performs two functions under the NLRA. t2 Under
section 10 of the Act, the Board decides whether or not particular
conduct violates the unfair labor practice prohibitions of section 8.
In addition to its adjudicative powers, the Board enforces these
prohibitions by conducting administrative hearings and issuing deci-
sions and orders, either dismissing complaints or requiring a party
to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice found. The Board
10. See, e.g., note 134 infra.
11. The focus of this article is upon Board doctrine under Miranda Fuel For a review
of the general development of the duty of fair representation before the courts. see Clark.
The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TE XAS L. Rrv. 1119 (1973).
Cox, 7he Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957); Summers, 7he Individual
Employee's Right Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitues Fair Representation, 126
U. PA. L. REv. 251 (1977).
12. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 24 (1937),
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is also empowered to issue orders requiring the parties to take such
affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of the Act.
1 3
Under section 9 of the Act, the Board administers the repre-
sentation determination procedures.' 4  Section 9(a) provides .that a
representative selected by the majority of employees in an appropri-
ate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of all unit
employees.' 5 "Central to the policy of fostering collective bargaining,
where the employees elect that course, is the principle of majority
rule., 16  The grant of exclusive representative status places "a non-
consenting minority under the bargaining responsibility of an agency
selected by a majority of the workers . . . . As stated by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their
economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen
by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most
effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and
working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes the individual
employee's power to order his own relations with his employer and
creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests
of all employees. . . . Thus only the union may contract the employee's
terms and conditions of employment, and provisions for processing his
grievances; the union may even bargain away his right to strike during
the contract term, and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line.
The employee may disagree with many of the union decisions but is
bound by them.'8
13. See Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 264-69
(1940).
14. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 405-06 (1940).
15. Section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of em-
ployees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to
have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-
bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining
representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
For an elaboration by the Supreme Court on the majority rule principle embodied in this
section, see NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1946).
16. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975).
The Court there held, relying heavily upon the principle of the exclusivity of the bargaining
representative, that minority employee protests against an employer's allegedly discrimina-
tory practices were not necessarily protected by § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), even
if the activity was arguably protected by Title VII. The Court also dealt with the congres-
sional allocation of different functions between the NLRB and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission. See generally Lopatka, Protection Under the National Labor Relations
Act and Title VII for Employees Who Protest Discrimination in Private Employment, 50
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1179 (1975).
17. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954). See International Ladies Garment
Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
18. 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967). See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Coin-
19771
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Thus, section 9 serves the underlying policy of the Act to foster col-
lective bargaining by vesting in the chosen bargaining representative
the powerful right of exclusivity within a given bargaining unit.
That this right carries with it a correlative duty to fairly represent
all employees within that unit was recognized early in the history of
the Act.
B. The Case Law Background
This duty of fair representation was initially developed by the
Supreme Court in a series of racial discrimination cases arising under
the Railway Labor Act (RLA). t9 In the first of these cases, Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad,20 the union was the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of a craft unit of firemen. A black minority
within the unit was excluded from membership. They were given
neither notice nor opportunity to be heard concerning agreements
negotiated by the union and the employer that substantially controlled
the seniority rights of blacks and restricted their employment op-
portunities. 21  The Court held that the black firemen could maintain
an action grounded in federal law22 against the union for breach of
the statutory duty to represent and act for all members of the craft, as
well as an action against the employer who purported to act upon the
basis of a proscribed agreement.
The Court noted that under the RLA employees have the right
to bargain through representatives of their choosing; that the majority
have the right to determine the representative; that the representative
bargains for working conditions applicable to the entire class of
employees; and that a representative was defined in part as any union
designated by the employees to act for them. In the Court's view, this
use of the term "representative" in the statute implied that the
representative must act on behalf of all the employees it represents,
It further noted that the Act imposes a duty upon the employer to
bargain exclusively with the majority representative, and that the
minority members are thus barred by the statute from choosing their
own representative or from bargaining individually with the employer.
munity Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). See also Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance
Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 731 (1950).
19. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1970). See generally R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 695-98 (1976).
20. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
21. At the outset of negotiations, the union advised the employer of the union's desire to
amend the contract so as ultimately to exclude all black firemen from srvice. Id, at 195.
22. Steele arose in a state court. Tunstall v. Brotherhood cf Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944), a companion case to Steele, hvld that the duty of fair
representation imposed by the RLA was a federal right arising under a law regulating com-
merce and was thus within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Court stated that the
duty "is a federal right implied from the statute and the policy which it has adopted" and
that it is "[t]he federal statute which condemns as unlawful the [union's] conduct," Id. at 213.
[Vol. 38:807
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Mr. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the Court, concluded that "[t]he
fair interpretation of the statutory language is that the organization
chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its members, the majority
as well as the minority, and it is to act for and not against those whom
it represents."23 The bargaining representative's duty of equal repre-
sentation was seen as at least as exacting as that imposed upon the
legislature by the equal protection clause of the Constitution.24
The Steele Court further stated that the Act imposes upon a
bargaining representative "the duty to exercise fairly the power con-
ferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile
discrimination."25 While noting that a representative is not barred
from making contracts that might have unfavorable effects on some
of the unit employees, and that variations based on "relevant" dif-
ferences (e.g., seniority, skill, type of work) are permissible, it held
that "discriminations" among unit members based upon race were not
relevant.
Without attempting to mark the allowable limits of differences in the
terms of contracts based on differences of conditions to which they ap-
ply, it is enough for present purposes to say that the statutory power to
represent a craft and to make contracts as to wages, hours and working
conditions does not include the authority to make among members of the
craft discriminations not based on such relevant differences. Here the
discriminations based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidi-
ous. Congress plainly did not undertake to authorize the bargaining
representative to make such discriminations.
26
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard27 extended the
RLA duty of fair representation beyond minority members of the
particular craft represented by the union. The union, exclusive repre-
sentative of white "brakemen," forced the employer to agree to dis-
charge black "train porters" who performed the same duties as white
"brakemen" but who had been treated by the employer and the union
as a separate class, for representation purposes, and who had been
represented by another union. The Court held that the union's racial
discrimination against noncraft members was nevertheless proscribed
23. 323 U.S. at 202. The Court held that appropriate remedial relief for breach of the
duty includes injunction and damages. Id. at 207. Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen'& Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1959), thereafter made clear that injunctive relief for
breach of the duty of fair representation was not barred by the anti-injunction prohibitions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970)). Graham also reaffirmed the il-
legality of union action based upon racial considerations.
24. The Court reasoned that "Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representa-
tive with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and
restrict the rights of those whom it represents . . . but it has also imposed on the representa-
tive a corresponding duty." 323 U.S. at 202.
25. Id. at 203.
26. Id.
27. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
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by the statutory duty. It found that the end result of the transactions
involved was that the black train porters were threatened with loss
of their jobs solely on grounds of race, that as in Steele discrimina-
tions based on race were irrelevant and invidious and unauthorized by
Congress, and that "[t]he Federal Act thus prohibits bargaining agents
it authorizes from using their position and power to destroy colored
workers' jobs in order to bestow them on white workers. And courts
can protect those threatened by such an unlawful use of power granted
by a federal act. 28
In Conley v. Gibson,29 the Court made clear that the bargaining
representative's duty of fair representation under the RLA is not con-
fined to contract negotiations but extends as well to the daily adminis-
tration of the contract, including the processing of grievances. Hold-
ing that the union could not refuse to bargain or process grievances
for employees upon the basis of race, the Court stated:
The bargaining representative's duty not to draw "irrelevant and in-
vidious" distinctions among those it represents does not come to an
abrupt end, as the respondents seem to contend, with the making of an
agreement between union and employer. Collective bargaining is a con-
tinuing process. Among other things, it involves day-to-day adjustments
in the contract and other working rules, resolution of new problems not
covered by existing agreements, and the protection of employee rights
already secured by contract. The bargaining representative can no more
unfairly discriminate in carrying out these functions than it can in nego-
tiating a collective agreement. A contract may be fair and impartial
on its face yet administered in such a way, with the active or tacit consent
of the union, as to be flagrantly discriminatory against some members of
the bargaining unit.30
The Supreme Court explained that the duty of fair representation
applied equally to the NLRA in the case of Ford Motor Co. v. Huff-
man.3t  There, the union and the employer negotiated an agreement
28. Id, at 774.
29. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
30. Id. at 46.
31. 345 U.S. 330 (1953). In the earlier case of Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248
(1944), involving an employer's violation of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970),
by utilizing a closed shop agreement to discriminate against members of the incumbent union's
rival union, the Court had stated:
The duties of a bargaining agent selected under the terms of the Act extend beyond
the mere representation of the interests of its own group members. By its selection as
bargaining representative, it has become the agent of all the employees, charged with
the responsibility of representing their interests fairly and iripartially. Otherwise,
employees who are not members of a selected union at the time it is chosen by the
majority would be left without adequate representation. No em!loyce can be deprived
of his employment because of his prior affiliation with any particular union, ..
Numerous decisions of this Court dealing with the Act have established beyond doubt
that workers shall not be discriminatorily discharged because of their affiliation with a
union. We do not construe the provision authorizing a closed shop contract as indi-
cating an intention on the part of Congress to authorize a majority of workers and a
company, as in the instant case, to penalize minority groups of workers by depriving
[Vol. 38:807
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which gave pre-employment seniority credit for military service, a
benefit in excess of the selective service law requirement that em-
ployees be given seniority credit for military service occurring subse-
quent to their employment. The plaintiff, representing a class of
veteran and nonveteran employees whose seniority ran from the
dates of their employment, claimed that but for the superseniority
granted by the negotiated provisions, he and others would not have
been laid off or furloughed. Plaintiff contended that by negotiating
these provisions, the union exceeded its authority under the NLRA.
The Supreme Court held generally that the duty of fair representa-
tion was applicable to unions covered by the NLRA, and noted par-
ticularly that the Act reflected Congress' faith in free collective bar-
gaining conducted by a freely and fairly chosen representative. 3
The Court stated further that in Steele it had been recognized that
the authority of the bargaining representative is not absolute, and
that "[t]heir statutory obligation to represent all members of an ap-
propriate unit requires them to make an honest effort to serve the
interests of all of those members, without hostility to any."33 The
duty does not preclude the representative from negotiating agree-
ments that prefer one group over another as long as the differences
are predicated upon' "reasonable grounds of relevancy.' The Court
stated:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms
of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of
employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make them
invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly
to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a
statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, sub-
ject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise
of its discretion.
Compromises on a temporary basis, with a view to long-range ad-
vantages, are natural incidents of negotiation. Differences in wages, hours
and conditions of employment reflect countless variables. Seniority
rules governing promotions, transfers, layoffs, and similar matters may,
in the first instance, revolve around length of competent service. Varia-
tions acceptable . . . may well include differences based upon such
matters as the unit within which seniority is to be computed, the
privileges to which it shall relate, the nature of the work, the time at
which it is done, the fitness, ability or age of the employees, their family
responsibilities, injuries received in course of service, and time or labor
devoted to related public service, whether civil or military, voluntary or
involuntary.34
them of that full freedom of association and self-organization which it was the prime
purpose of the Act to protect for all workers.
323 U.S. at 255-56.
32. 345 U.S. at 337.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 338-39. The Court also Uoted that the NLRA does not require a bargaining
1977]
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Finding that the pre-employment service credit was consistent with
both public policy and fairness as embodied in federal selective service
and veteran preference laws, and thus "within reasonable bounds of
relevancy, '35 the Court concluded that the union had the authority to
accept the negotiated provisions. 36
The principle that the duly certified collective bargaining repre-
sentative has a duty to provide equal representation to all employees
in the unit regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin was early
applied by the Board in two areas. Thus, the Board indicated that it
would consider rescinding the certification of a union that denied
equal representation on such grounds." The Board also ruled that
collective bargaining contracts that discriminate along racial lines will
not bar a representation election.38
This then represented the evolution and development of the duty
of fair representation prior to Miranda Fuel Under the NLRA, the
union, as exclusive bargaining representative, had a statutory duty to
represent all employees in the bargaining unit fairly, both in collective
bargaining with the employer and in its enforcement of the collective
bargaining agreement. A union breached that duty when it acted
against a unit employee for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons, or in
bad faith. Suits by an employee against a union for breach of the
duty were cognizable by federal and state courts with remedies in-
cluding damages and injunction. Limited relief was also potentially
available before the Board to the extent it undertook to police its
certifications as part of its section 9 representation authority. Against
this background a truckdriver for the Miranda Fuel Company in New
York asked for a simple leave of absence, never dreaming that this
request would be the first in a chain of events culminating in a Board
doctrine of broad application and limited justification.
representative to base seniority solely upon employment services. See Aeronautical Lodge v.
Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
35. 345 U.S. at 342.
36. An attempt by a few courts to hold the duty of fair representation under the NLRA
inapplicable where all employees were members of the union wa; short-lived. Syres v. Oil
Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), rev'g per curiam, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
See also Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 840
(1953), relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in Syres. The Third and Fifth Circuits were of the
view that because all of the employees were union members, the union's authority derived
from the members' voluntary consent and not from § 9(a) of the NLRA.
37. Eg., Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 55 (1962); Hugl-es Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B.
318, 319-24 (1953); Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 973, 975-76 (1945); Carter Mfg.
Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 804, 806 (1944). For later application of the doctrine resulting in revocation
of a certification for racial discrimination, see Teamsters Local 671 (Airborne Freight Corp.),
199 N.L.R.B. 994 (1972); Metal Workers Local I (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573
(1964).
38. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962). Under the Board's contract-bar doctrine,
a valid written collective bargaining agreement, properly executed and binding on the parties,
and for a definite term, will generally bar an election for the contract term up to three years.
General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962); Appalachian Shal,.- Prods. Co., 121 N.L.RBI
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C. The Miranda Fuel Decisions39
The Miranda Fuel case progressed through a number of stages
before giving rise to the doctrine for which it is well known. A
knowledge of this background is essential to an understanding of the
reasoning ultimately resorted to by the Board.
1. Miranda Fuel I
In Miranda Fuel, the employer and the union were parties to a
collective bargaining agreement covering a unit of truckdrivers in New
York. In April 1957, one of the drivers, Lopuch, requested and re-
ceived permission from the employer to take a leave of absence for
personal business in Cleveland, Ohio. Section 8 of the labor contract
authorized personal leave during the slack season from April 15 to
October 15 for any employee who would not, "according to seniority,"
have steady employment during that period . On October 10, Lopuch
telephoned the employer from Cleveland and said he would be back to
work by October 15. On October 14, Lopuch became ill and did not
recover until October 28. He advised the employer of his illness and
of his intention to return to work when he recovered. Upon his re-
turn on October 30, Lopuch was initially retained in his regular
1160 (1958); Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958). In Pioneer Bus, the Board
stated:
Consistent with clear court decisions in other contexts which condemn govern-
mental sanctioning of racially separate groupings as inherently discriminatory, the
Board will not permit its contract-bar rules to be utilized to shield contracts such as those
here involved from the challenge of otherwise appropriate election petitions. We
therefore hold that, where the bargaining representative of employees in an appropri-
ate unit executes separate contracts, or even a single contract, discriminating between
Negro and white employees on racial lines, the Board will not deem such contracts as
a bar to an election.
140 N.L.R.B. at 55.
39. 125 N.L.R.B. 454 (1959), enforced, 284 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960), vacated and remanded
per curiam sub nom. Local 553, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 763 (1961), dec.
on remand, 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). For
early commentary on the Miranda decisions, see Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation
Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. Ray. 373 (1965); Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Representa.
tion and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L. Rav. 771 (1965).
40. Section 8 of the contract provided in relevant part:
Section 8. It is agreed by both parties that depot seniority shall prevail ...
It is further understood and agreed that during the dull season of the year,
preference shall be given to the fuel oil chauffeurs on the seniority list, and that the
Shop Steward shall be the No. 1 fuel chaffeur on the list.
During the slack season, April 15 to October 15, any employee who according
to seniority would not have steady employment shall be entitled to a leave of absence
and maintain his full seniority rights during that period. Any man so described must
report to the Shop Steward not later than 8 A.M. on Oct9ber 15 and sign the seniority
roster in order to protect his seniority, and the Employer agrees to accept the certifi-
cation of said Shop Steward as to availability of such men when called by the Em-
ployer. If October 15 falls on a Saturday or Sunday, the reporting day shall be the
next work day. Any man failing to report as above specified 1hall forfeit seniority
rights.
125 N.L.R.B. at 463.
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seniority rank as 11 th of 21 drivers. The union's first demand, that
Lopuch be placed at the bottom of the seniority list because of his
failure to report to the shop steward on October 15 as required by
Section 8 of the contract, was abandoned after a physician in Cleve-
land verified Lopuch's illness. The union then asserted that Lopuch
must nevertheless be placed at the bottom of the seniority list be-
cause he had gone on leave prior to the April 15 date referred to in
Section 8 of the contract as the start of the slack season.4 1 The
employer reluctantly complied with the union's demand because it
believed it had no alternative under the contract, despite the fact that
it had granted Lopuch permission to take the leave when he did.
In Miranda Fuel I, the Board found that Section 8 of the contract
by its express terms only applied to employees entitled to a leave
during the April 15 to October 15 slack season because according to
seniority they would not have steady 'employment.42  The record
showed that the employer had steady work available for Lopuch dur-
ing the slack season. Because Lopuch took his leave for personal
reasons, not because his seniority would have precluded his having
steady employment during the slack season, and was granted his leave
prior to April 15, the Board concluded that Section 8 of the contract
was inapplicable. The employer's acquiescence in the union's de-
mand, motivated by the employer's practice to allow union determina-
tion of matters affecting employee seniority, violated section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the NLRA. 43  The union violated section 8(b)(2) and
(b)(1)(A)44 of the Act by causing the employer to engage in such dis-
crimination.45
41. The union's demand for the reduction of Lopuch's seniority was based upon a
request by other union members employed by the employer. Id. at 464.
42. Id. at 457.
43. Section 8(a) of the Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7; . . . (3) by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in cny labor organization
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1970).
44. Section 8(b) of the Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain
or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 ....
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee
. . . with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining member-
ship ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), (2) (1970).
45. In so holding in Miranda Fuel , the Board, relying upon the doctrine of Pacific In-
termountain Express Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 837 (1954), enforced, 223 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 952 (1956), stated:
The record in this case discloses, and we find, that the seniority provision in question
was not by its terms applicable to Lopuch's situation, and thus the reduction in his
seniority, though accomplished under the guise of contractual agreement, was never-
theless not the result of the Union's performance of a purely ministerial act, but in fact
[Vol. 38:807
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Miranda Fuel I was enforced by the Second Circuit. 6 Upon
grant of the union's petition for certiorari and the Board's acquiescence
therein, however, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Board
47
for consideration in view of the Supreme Court's intervening decision
in Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB.4s In
Local 357 the Court, rejecting the Board's theory, held that an exclu-
sive hiring hall agreement between an employer and a union was not
per se unlawful under section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and that a
union's demand for the discharge of an employee who had been hired
without having been referred through the union hiring hall did not vio-
late section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A). The Court held that the mere enforce-
ment of the agreement, without more, was not the kind of discrimina-
tion proscribed by the Act. The Court stated that "[it is the 'true
purpose' or 'real motive' in hiring or firing that constitutes the test."
49
The Court noted that the encouragement of union membership that
may occur whenever a union performs its job well is not the discrimi-
natory encouragement proscribed by the Act. Mr. Justice Douglas
stated for the Court, "but, as we said in [Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB30] the only encouragement or discouragement of union mem-
bership banned by the Act is that which is 'accomplished by discrim-
ination.' "51 The Court thus found that the mere delegation to the
was effectuated through concession by the Company to a position taken by the Union
which, although purportedly in reliance on the contractual provision, nevertheless was
outside the scope of the parties' agreement and within the field of seniority generally.
As the contract clearly did not cover Lopuch's situation, we find that it cannot serve as a
defense to the discrimination inherent in the reduction of Lopuch's seniority.
125 N.L.R.B. at 455-56.
46. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 284 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960). The court found that the
contract did not delegate exclusive control over seniority to the union since the contract con-
tained objective criteria for determining seniority. The court did concur in the Board's
finding that Lopuch's seniority reduction was not authorized by the contract and represented
a delegation of power over seniority from the employer to the union that improperly en-
couraged union membership and discriminated against Lopuch. The court stressed the im-
portance of the fact that "the action taken was against and not under the agreement . . .
Id. at 863. In the court's view, when a contract contains objective criteria for the determina-
tion of seniority, and when application of the provisions involves "merely administrative or
ministerial functions" on the part of the union, there is no improper delegation of authority to a
union that would encourage union membership or discriminate against employees. Id.
47. Local 553, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 763 (1961).
48. 365 U.S. 667 (1961). See also NLRB v. Neis Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961).
49. 365 U.S. at 675.
50. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
51. 365 U.S. at 676. The Court further stated:
It may be that the very existence of the hiring hall encourages union membership.
We may assume that it does. The very existence of the union has the same influence.
When a union engages in collective bargaining and obtains increased wages and im-
proved working conditions, its prestige doubtless rises and, one may assume, more
workers are drawn to it. When a union negotiates collective bargaining agreements
that include arbitration clauses and supervises the functioning of those provisions so
as to get equitable adjustments of grievances, union membership may also be en-
couraged. The truth is that the union is a service agency that probably encourages
union membership whenever it does its job welL
Id. at 675-76. For subsequent development of the discriminatory motivation analysis, see
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union of substantial control over and involvement in the hiring pro-
cess did not violate the Act. This decision indicated that the delega-
tion to the union of control over employee seniority might likewise
be considered conduct protected under the NLRA.
2. Miranda Fuel H52
Upon remand, the Board found that its initial decision could not
stand in light of Local 357 and held that the mere delegation to the
union of the authority to determine seniority for employees was not a
sufficient predicate on which to find discrimination." The Board did
not read Local 357, however, to sanction any union action affecting an
employee's employment status that was not based upon the employee's
union membership or activities. The Board thereupon developed an
alternative ground upon which to find the union's conduct unlawful,
namely breach of the duty of fair representation as an unfair labor
practice. Looking to the doctrine of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad 4 and its progeny, the Board found that the duty of fair rep-
resentation imposed upon an exclusive bargaining agent under the
Act, when viewed in the context of the section 7 right of employees
"to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing," meant that section 7 of the Act "gives employees the right to
be free from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their ex-
clusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their employment."
55
Reasoning that "[t]his right of employees is a statutory limitation on
statutory bargaining representatives," the Board concluded that
"[s]ection 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act accordingly prohibits labor organiza-
tions, when acting in a statutory representative capacity, from taking
action against any employee upon considerations or classifications
which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair."56 The Board noted that
while a union, as statutory bargaining representative, has obligations
to employees that employers do not, nevertheless employer participa-
tion in a union's arbitrary action against an employee violates sec-
tion 8(a)(1). The Board further concluded that a union violates sec-
tion 8(b)(2), and an employer violates section 8(a)(3), when a union
causes or attempts to cause an employer to derogate the employment
status of an employee for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons, or because
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); American Ship Bldg. Co, v. NLRB, 380
U.S. 300 (1965); Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
52. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963).
53. 140 N.L.R.B. at 183.
54. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See notes 20-38 supra and accompanying text.
55. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
56. Id.
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of an unfair classification.57 In this regard the Board did not read
Local 357 as overruling the holding of Radio Officers that union mem-
bership is encouraged or discouraged when a union causes an em-
ployer to affect an employee's employment status. Rather, in the
Board's view, Local 357 held that while a section 8(a)(3) or 8(b)(2)
violation may not automatically follow from conduct that has a fore-
seeable result of encouraging union membership, the existence of a
violation may turn upon an evaluation of the legitimacy of the em-
ployer or union purposes underlying the conduct.58
Applying this set of principles, the Board found that because the
union caused Lopuch's seniority reduction in violation of the contract
and pursuant to the unjustified pressure of certain union employees,
the union had no legitimate union purpose and interfered with Lopuch's
right to fair and impartial treatment in derogation of section 8(b)(1)
(A). The Board further found that the union caused the employer to
discriminate against Lopuch, which had a foreseeable effect of en-
couraging union membership. Because this discrimination was in
violation of the contract and otherwise arbitrary and without legiti-
mate purpose, the union violated sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (2), and the
employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3).
Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning dissented. In their
view, since there was no showing that union considerations motivated
the employer or the union-that is, no proof of unlawful discrimination
-there was no violation of section 8(bX2) or 8(a)(3). They regarded
the majority as applying the naked arrogation doctrine rejected by the
Supreme Court in Local 357. It is difficult to improve upon the dis-
sent's critical analysis of the Board's misapplication of section 8(b)(2)
and avoidance of the discriminatory motivation prerequisite. The
dissent makes an incisive, devastating legal argument that, until finally
answered by the Supreme Court, will necessarily limit the vitality of
Miranda Fuel.
The dissenters found no basis for the majority's conclusion that a
union's breach of its duty of fair representation violates section 8(b)
(1)(A), and that an employer's acquiescence therein violates section
8(a)(1). Agreeing with the majority that section 9 of the Act imposes
57. The Board stated: "This would obtain, for example, where for arbitrary or irrelevant
reasons, a statutory bargaining representative attempts to cause an employee's discharge and
the employer then becomes party to such violation of Section 7 rights by acceding to the union's
efforts." Id. at 186.
58. The Board commented:
Unlike our colleagues, we do not interpret the Court's opinion [in Local 357] as permit-
ting unions and their agents an open season to affect an employee's employment status
for any reason at all-personal, arbitrary, unfair, capricious, and the like--merely because
the moving consideration does not involve the specific union membership or activities
of the affected employee.
Id. at 188.
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a duty on the statutory bargaining representative to represent all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit fairly and impartially, the dissenters
disagreed that the unfair labor practice provisions of section 8 provide
a remedy. Rather, they considered existing court remedies to be
adequate. The dissenters found nothing in the history of the Act, or
in Board and court precedent, to support the view that sections 8(b)
(1)(A) and 8(a)(1) had the reach given them by the majority. The
dissent stated:
We join our colleagues in their condemnation of arbitrary and invidious
action against employees, whether at the hands of their employers or
at the hands of their bargaining representatives. We recognize also that
their proposal represents a laudable effort to reach-in appropriate cases
-union or employer conduct which falls outside the literal scope of the
Act's prohibitory unfair labor practice provisions. But to say that a
proposal is laudable and that it has a salutary objective does not endow
it with legal validity. 59
Miranda Fuel II was denied enforcement by the Second Circuit.
60
The court found that the "per se theory" developed and applied by
the Board in its remand decision was "novel, if not quite revolution-
ary,"61 and that sections 8(b)(2) and (1)(A), and 3(a)(3) and (1), are
violated only when the union or employer conduct is predicated upon
union considerations. The court felt that discrimination based upon
reasons unrelated to union membership, loyalty, the acknowledgment
of union authority, or the performance of union obligations, are not
sufficient to establish violations. Rather, there must be an intent and
purpose, or a deliberate design, of encouraging or discouraging union
membership. The court concluded that the unfair labor practice
machinery of the Board was "not suited to the task of deciding gen-
eral questions of private wrongs, unrelated to union activities, suf-
fered by employees as a result of tortious conduct by either employers
or labor unions., 62
59. Id. at 202 (Members Fanning and Jenkins dissenting).
60. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Chief Judge Lumbard
concurred and Judge Friendly dissented.
61. Id. at 177.
62. Id. at 180. In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Lum')ard agreed that conduct
wholly unrelated to- the employee's relationship with the union does not violate §§ 8(a)(3) or
8(b)(2). He stated that he would not reach the question of whether breach of the duty of fair
representation might constitute an unfair labor practice because the union did not in fact
breach its duty. Chief Judge Lumbard found that:
The evidence upon which the Board relies is insufficient to support its conclusion that the
union took "hostile action, for irrelevant, unfair or invidious reasons" against Lopuch,
The Board adduced no evidence to suggest that the union acted, albeit in response to
the demands of the other employees, otherwise than in a beliel, honestly held, that
Lopuch had lost his seniority under the collective bargaining agreement. Such con-
duct does not constitute a violation of the duty of fair representition implicit in Sec-
tion 9 of the Act.
Id. at 180.
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It is important to note the extent to which the Board's theory
and holding in Miranda Fuel II rests upon the Board's reaching an
interpretation of the contract different from that of the union, and not
upon independent evidence of hostile, invidious, bad faith, or anti-
union motivation. The contract appeared to require a forfeiture only
for failure to return on time from a leave of absence, and the union
apparently recognized the inapplicability of this condition once it
learned of Lopuch's illness. The union nevertheless construed the
contract to prohibit early departure on leave. In the Board's view, this
clause of the contract was designed to eliminate seasonal fluctua-
tions in employment and thus to apply only to employees who would
not have had steady employment during the slack season. Lopuch
was not such an employee and, therefore, Section 8 of the contract did
not apply to his leave of absence. Whether the Board's or the union s
construction was correct, it seems that sufficient ambiguity concerning
the application of Section 8 of the contract existed to preclude finding
on that basis alone that the union's position was predicated upon bad
faith or irrelevancy.
Stated differently, it does not seem unreasonable for the union
(and the employer) to have believed in good faith that a fair interpre-
tation of Section 8 of the contract required a forfeiture of seniority
for any employee who took a leave of absence prior to the designated
April 15 to October 15 slack period.63  The Board thus did not evalu-
ate real evidence of union motivation, nor of the union's good faith.
Rather, it sat in review of the union's contract interpretation and
passed judgment based upon its own views of reasonableness. This
is one of the most significant aspects of Miranda Fuel II: the Board's
interjection of itself by way of section 8 of the NLRA into the labor-
management arena as judge of fairness and reasonableness, not of
discrimination. This places the Board dangerously close to the role of
63. The Second Circuit noted that this interpretation of section 8 of the contract "seems
to us far from unreasonable, particularly if made by laymen and not by lawyers, taking into
consideration the purpose of said Section 8." Id. at 175.
The union had contended that section 8 of the contract in fact applied to drivers who
went on leave before April 15 even with the employer's permission. The Board found that even
assuming arguendo the validity of this contention, the union "certainly was charged with an
obligation of fair dealing so to have informed the employer and Lopuch, for it was common
knowledge that Lopuch intended to take leave during the slack season for personal reasons
unrelated to the objectives of the contract." 140 N.L.R.B. at 190. The Board also found that
even viewing this interpretation as a demand for contract modification, insistence on retro-
active application of the modification to Lopuch breached its duty of fair dealing because
"Lopuch had no reason to anticipate any change in his rights under the contract or to believe
that, if the contract changed, it would be applied retroactively to deprive him of his seniority
standing. The sacrifice of Lopuch to placate the other drivers does not, in our opinion,
comport with the requirements of fair dealing." Id.
Concerning union action arguably contrary to the contract and/or union constitution and
bylaws, see Denver Stereotypers Local 13 (Denver Post, Inc.), 231 N.LRLB. No. 96,96 L.R.R.M.
1073 (1977); United Steelworkers (Miami Copper Co.), 190 N.L.R.B. 43 (1971); Ironworkers
Local 229, 183 N.L.R.B. 271 (1970).
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dispenser of its own particular, frequently changing views of industrial
justice.14
The Supreme Court appeared to reject the standard applied by
the Board in Miranda Fuel when it decided Vaca v. Sipes.t'  Vaca
involved an employee's state court suit 66 alleging that the union
64. In this connection, note the admonitions given the Board by the Supreme Court
concerning the limitations placed upon the Board in its evaluation of good faith bargaining
under §§ 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), and 8(d) of the Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5). (b)(3). (d)(1970)). In
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952), the Court stated: "[Tlhe Board
may not, either directly or indirectly, . . . sit in judgment upor the substantive terms of
collective bargaining agreements." In NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 US, 477
(1960), the Court stated:
Since the Board was not viewed by Congress as an agency which should exercise its
powers to arbitrate the parties' substantive solutions of the issues in their bargaining, a
check on this apprehended trend was provided by writing the good-faith test of bar-
gaining into § 8(d) of the Act.
I. It must be realized that collective bargaining under a system where the Gov-
ernment does not attempt to control the results of negotiations, cannot be equated with
an academic collective search for truth-or even with what might be thought to be the
ideal of one ....
Our labor policy is not presently erected on a foundation of government
control of the results of negotiations.
Id. at 486, 488, 490. And in his dissenting opinion in H.K. Porter Co, v. NLRB, 397 U.S, 99,
103 (1970), Mr. Justice Douglas observed:
The object of this Act was not to allow governmental regulation of the terms and
conditions of employment, but rather to ensure that employers and their employees
could work together to establish mutually satisfactory condition,. The basic theme of
the Act was that through collective bargaining the passions, arguments, and struggles
of prior years would be channeled into constructive, open disc j sions leading, it was
hoped, to mutual agreement. But it was recognized from the beginning that agree-
ment might in some cases be impossible, and it was never intended that the Govern-
ment would in such cases step in, become a party to the negotiations and impose its
own views of a desirable settlement.
See generally Feinsinger, The National Labor Relations Act and Collective Bargaining. 57
MICH. L. REV. 807 (1959).
65. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
66. Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1966), rev'd, 386 U.S, 171 (1967). The Supreme
Court made clear in Vaca that the Board's "tardy assumption of jurisdiction in these cases"
did not preempt federal and state court jurisdiction over suits for breach of the duty of fair
representation, 386 U.S. at 183, and reaffirmed an employee's right i.o maintain a § 301 action
in federal court against an employer for wrongful discharge in brech of contract even if the
challenged employer's conduct is also arguably an unfair labor practice within the Board's
jurisdiction. Kg., Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), See Carey v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964). Section 301(a) of the Act provides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the .4mount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). See generally Feinsinger, Enforcement of labor Agreements-A New
Era in Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1957). Generally as a precondition to such
suit the employee must attempt to exhaust contractual grievance and arbitration procedures.
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). The Court also held in Vaca that the
employee's suit is not barred by the exclusive contractual procedures where the union has
breached its duty of fair representation in handling the employee's grievances, Preliminary
judicial determination of the question of the union's breach of its duty will, therefore, fre-
quently be required before the § 301 suit against the employer can proceed. See also Hines
v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
Oversimplifying and overgeneralizing, the preemption doctrine provides that in order to
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breached its duty of fair representation by refusing to take to arbitra-
tion the employee's grievance for wrongful discharge in violation of
the labor contract. The union refused to process the grievance to
arbitration because in the union's view the medical evidence was in-
sufficient to prove the employee's fitness for work. The Court stressed
that there was no evidence that any of the union officers were person-
ally hostile to the employee nor that the union acted other than in good
faith. Therefore, the Court held that because the evidence did not
show that the union acted arbitrarily or in bad faith, it had not
breached its duty.67  The Court emphasized that an individual em-
ployee has no absolute right to have a grievance arbitrated and that
breach of the duty of fair representation is not shown simply by proof
that the underlying grievance may have been meritorious.
avoid state and federal conflicts of law, and to further the primary administrative authority
of the Board, the states lack jurisdiction when the activity involved is arguably subject to
the NLRA. "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as
the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
The rationale for pre-emption . . . rests in large measure upon our determination
that when it set down a federal labor policy Congress plainly meant to do more than
simply to alter the then-prevrailing substantive law. It sought as well to restructure
fundamentally the processes for effectuating that policy, deliberately placing the
responsibility for applying and developing this comprehensive legal system in the
hands of an expert administrative body rather than the federalized judicial system.
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 288 (1971). See Farmer
v. Carpenters Local 25, 97 S. Ct. 1056 (1977); Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Emp. ReL Comm'n,
427 U.S. 132 (1976). State jurisdiction and remedies have been permitted in a variety of
situations including areas of serious local concern or of only peripheral concern to the NLRA.
!-g., Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 426 U.S. 903 (1977) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress); American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974) (picketing of
foreign flag vessels); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (libel); UAW
v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (violence); IAM v. Gonzalez, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (wrongful
expulsion from union membership); Allen-Bradley Local 1111, Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin
Emp. Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (mass picketing). Compare Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine
Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965) with Beasley v. Food Fair, Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974)
(supervisors). See generally Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Cur-
rent Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REv. 1435 (1970); Cox, Labor Law Pre-
emption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337 (1972).
67. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), which arose in the context of an
amalgamation of two separate businesses whose employees were represented by the same
union. In that case the union was held not to have breached its duty of fair representation by
agreeing with the employer to dovetail the seniority lists. The union's action %as predicated
upon its view that the contract authorized the resolution. The Court found that the union
"took its position honestly, in good faith and without hostility or arbitrary discrimination"
and that by "choosing to integrate seniority lists based upon length of service at either
company, the union acted upon wholly relevant considerations, not upon capricious or arbi-
trary factors." The Court rejected the contention that the union could not fairly represent
the antagonistic interests of the two groups of employees, stating:
But we are not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining agents duty of fair
representation in taking a good faith position contrary to that of some individuals whom
it represents nor in supporting the position of one group of employees against that of
another. ... Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous grievances
which would only clog the grievance -process, so it must be free to take a position on
the not so frivolous disputes. Nor should it be neutralized when the issue is chiefly
between two sets of employees. Conflict between employees represented by the same
union is a recurring fact. To remove or gag the union in these cases would surely
weaken the collective bargaining and grievance processes.
Id. at 349-50.
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In deciding Vaca, the Supreme Court merely noted, but did not
approve or disapprove, the Miranda Fuel doctrine. 68  Particularly in-
triguing, however, is the fact that the standard of liability applied by
the state court and rejected by the Supreme Court in Vaca appears
to be the standard applied by the Board in Miranda Fuel 1. The ques-
tion that the state court in Vaca regarded as dispositive of the issue
of liability was whether the evidence supported the employee's as-
sertion that he had been wrongfully discharged by the employer, ir-
respective of the union's good faith in taking a different view."9 The
Supreme Court found that this standard was inconsistent with govern-
ing principles of federal law regarding a union's duty of fair represen-
tation, and that the plaintiff had failed to prove a breach of that duty.
The Court made clear that the standard of liability was a much stricter
one, namely, whether or not the union acted arbitrarily, discriminator-
ily or in bad faith. The Court stated:
[I]f a union's decision that a particular grievance lacks sufficient merit to
justify arbitration would constitute a breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation because a judge or jury later found the grievance meritorious, the
union's incentive to settle such grievances short of arbitration would be
seriously reduced. The dampening effect on the entire grievance pro-
cedure of this reduction of the union's freedom to settle claims in good
faith would surely be substantial.70
68. The Court referred to Miranda Fuel in the context of the preemption doctrine stat-
ing that a principal basis for preemption, the need to entrust primary administrative authority
to the Board in order to avoid conflicting rules of law between :ourt and Board, was not
present because in the Court's view the Board was simply adopt'ng the fair representation
doctrine as it had been judicially developed. Thus, the Court found that "when the Board
declared in Miranda Fuel that a union's breach of its duty of fair representation would
henceforth be treated as an unfair labor practice, the Board adopted and applied the doctrine
as it had been developed by the federal courts." 386 U.S. at 181. See also Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), in which the Court stated:
Although there are differing views on whether a violation of the duty of fair repre-
sentation is an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act, it is
not necessary for us to resolve that difference here. Even if it i3, or arguably may be,
an unfair labor practice, the complaint here alleged that Moore's discharge would
violate the contract and was therefore within the cognizance of federal and state courts,
' .* subject, of course, to the applicable federal law.
Id. at 344. In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50,
71-72 n.25 (1975), the Court also noted but did not pass upon Miranda Fuel, See also
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). It seems that
the Court has avoided coming to grips with Miranda Fuel.
69. 386 U.S. at 189.
70. Id. at 192-93. Compare the following statement of the Board in Newspaper Guild
Local 26 (Buffalo-Courier Express, Inc.), 220 N.L.R.B. 79, 89 (1975):
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that, although it is not a
function of the Board to decide the merits of a grievance in determining whether a labor
organization has unlawfully failed or refused to process it, "some evaluation of the
grievance or grievances at issue must be made." While the General Counsel is not
required to show that the grievance is prima facie meritorious, it must at least appear
from the record that the grievance is not clearly frivolous.
In Vaca, the Court summed up its view of the duty of fair representation and the standard to
be applied in determining breach of the duty as follows:
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It is clear from the foregoing that there are several major defi-
ciencies in the Miranda Fuel decision, quite apart from the questions
raised by its subsequent application. The finding of a section 8(b)(2)
and 8(a)(3) violation without proof of discriminatory motivation ap-
pears flatly inconsistent with the scheme of those sections as articu-
lated in such cases as Radio Officers and Local 357.71 The finding of
an independent section 8(b)(1)(A) violation, as discussed more fully
later, appears completely inconsistent with the language and purpose
of that section. Further, the predicate for the violation found was
not an arbitrary or invidious action such as that proscribed by Steele
and its progeny-particularly Vaca-but rather the Board's different in-
terpretation of the contract terms from that of the union. The essen-
tial vice of Miranda Fuel seems to be that it rested upon the Board's
subjective appraisal of reasonableness, not of arbitrariness or invidi-
ousness.
II. EXPANSION OF THE Miranda Fuel DOCTRINE TO
NEw BASES OF UNION ACTION
In spite of its uncertain foundation in national labor relations
theory and the refusal by the Second Circuit to enforce the Board's
order, Miranda Fuel II soon became established Board doctrine. The
Board has steadily expanded its application of this doctrine to invali-
date a variety of bases for union action or inaction.
A. Racial Discrimination
The Board has consistently held that union action predicated upon
racially discriminatory motivations constitutes a breach of the duty
of fair representation. In Metal Workers Union Local I (Hughes Tool
Co.) 72 two locals were jointly certified. One represented black em-
ployees in the unit and the other represented white employees. The
white local refused to process a black employee's grievance. The
Board found that the union's action, motivated by racial discrimina-
tion, was a refusal to represent the employee, thereby restraining his
section 7 right to fair representation. The dissenting members re-
Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members
of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all mem-
bers without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with
complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct... .A breach of
the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a
member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
386 U.S. at 177, 190.
71. See notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text.
72. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). Members Leedom, Brown, and Jenkins for the majority.
Former Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning concurring in part and dissenting in part.
See generally W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERs IN WHITE UNIONS 163-206 (1977); Soverm, 7he
National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLtU?. L. REv. 563 (1962).
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peated their view that neither section 7 nor section 8(b)(l)(A) en-
compasses a duty of fair representation that could be the predicate
for an unfair labor practice. 3  The dissenters would have found a
violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) only on the ground of the union's
conceded failure to process the grievance because of the black em-
ployee's nonmembership in the white local.
The majority also found that the failure to process the grievance
violated section 8(b)(2) because the employee was denied treatment
that he would have received had he been eligible for membership in
the white local. Relying upon the Miranda Fuel rationale-that union
action based upon arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of
an unfair classification violates the Act-the majority found that the
union's failure to act, based upon such reasons, was equally a viola-
tion. The dissenting members repeated their position that section 8
(b)(2) proscribes only discrimination that relates to "union member-
ship, loyalty, the acknowledgment of union authority, or the perfor-
mance of union obligations. '74 They would have found no union at-
tempt to cause employer discrimination within the meaning of section
8(b)(2) since the contract was not in issue nor had the union sought
any employer action concerning the grievance.
Similarly, in Local 12, United Rubber Workers (Business League
of Gadsden),75 the union refused to process grievances of Negro em-
ployees who claimed back wages for layoffs resulting from the racially
discriminatory seniority system previously followed by the parties and
sought the elimination of racial segregation in plant facilities and ser-
vices. The Board found that the union's refusal was based "upon
the racially invalid interpretation" that had been placed upon the cur-
rent and prior contracts, that the union would have processed the
grievances to arbitration but for those "racially discriminatory rea-
sons," and that the union thereby violated sections 8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(2)
and 8(b)(3).76 The Board stated:
We are not to be understood as holding that the Respondent or any
labor organization must process to arbitration any grievance other than
the precise areas discussed herein. We hold only that where the rec-
ord demonstrates that a grievance would have been processed to arbi-
tration but for racially discriminatory reasons, the failure so to process
it violates the Act because the statutory agent's duty is to represent with-
out regard to race. . . . [W]hatever may be the bases on which a statu-
73. 147 N.L.R.B. at 1586-90 (Members McCulloch and Fanning dissenting).
74. Id.
75. 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964).
76. Id. at 317. Members Leedom, Brown, and Jenkins compoed the majority. Former
Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning dissented based upon the views in their dissent in
Miranda Fuel II and their separate opinion in Hughes Tool Co. See txt accompanying notes 59
and 74 supra.
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tory representative may properly decline to process grievances, the
bases must bear a reasonable relation to the union's role as bargaining
representative or to its function as a labor organization; manifestly,
racial discrimination bears no such relationship. 7
With regard to the refusal to process grievances calling for the de-
segregation of plant facilities, the Trial Examiner had found the
union's action within the range of discretion allowed a union to
determine what demands to make in bargaining and when to make
them. The Board disagreed, stating that "a statutory representative's
conduct to maintain an unlawful end [segregated facilities] finds no
defense in the representative's belief, however sincerely held, that the
end is desirable. 78
In its enforcement of the Board's decision,79 the Fifth Circuit
agreed with the Board's Miranda Fuel II doctrine to the extent of
holding that a union's breach of the duty of fair representation is an
unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A).' 0 Disagreeing with
the Second Circuit's approach in Miranda Fuel II, the Fifth Circuit
stated that it was "convinced that the duty of fair representation im-
plicit in the exclusive-representation requirement in Section 9(a) of
the act comprises an indispensable element of the right of employees
'to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing'
as guaranteed in Section 7."81 By summarily refusing to process the
grievances, the union had restrained the employees in the exercise of
their section 7 rights in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A). The court
further found irrelevant that the union's conduct did not encourage
or discourage union membership because the language of section 8(b)
(1)(A), unlike that of sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3), is not restricted to
discrimination that encourages or discourages union membership.
In Local 1367, International Longshoremen's Association (Gal-
veston Maritime Association),82 the Board found that a local union
made up of white members only, and its parent district organization,
violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by maintaining and enforcing a work ap-
portionment agreement with the employer that provided for a 75-25
77. 150 N.L.R.B. at 317 (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 319. The Board reaffirmed the proposition that the duty of fair representation
applies to union members and nonmembers alike. "We submit that a union's duty not to dis-
criminate unfairly against nonmembers in presenting grievances ... is no different from its duty
not to discriminate unfairly against members in presenting grievances, and that the touchstone
is not the irrelevant consideration of membership but the relevant requirement of fair represen-
tation of all employees in the unit." Id. at 320.
79. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 837 (1967).
80. Having found that the union's conduct violated § 8(bXIXA), the court did not consider
it necessary to reach the § 8(b)(2) and 8(bX3) findings of the Board.
81. 368 F.2d at 17.
82. 148 N.L.RB. 897 (1964).
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percent work distribution between the white local and a black sister
local.83  The Board also found unlawful a "no-doubling" provision of
the agreement which forbade the assignment of white and black crews
to work together. The Board found that the clauses constituted
segregation or discrimination resulting from inherently unequal and
unfair representation, and that the union had thereby "failed to com-
ply with their duty as an exclusive bargaining representative to
represent all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and impar-
tially.",8 4  The Board also held that perpetuation cf the discriminatory
provisions as a condition of employment "grounded upon membership"
violated section 8(b)(2) because it caused the employer to violate sec-
tion 8(a)(3). 85 The Fifth Circuit, in a per curiam decision citing its
opinion in Local 12, Rubber Workers, enforced the Board's order .
6
In a concurring opinion, Judge Choate agreed that the facts of the
case reflected a breach of the union's duty of fair representation that
constituted an unfair labor practice. He stated further:
However, I fully realize that here the Board is treading perilous waters
by taking over the duties of unions. By far, the preferable procedure is
to let individuals take ordinary steps, such as filing suit, to adjust such
grievances. The reasoning in Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B,, 5th Cir.,
368 F.2d 12, No. 22239, in my opinion tends to set a dangerous precedent,
in that it puts the court in the position of approving the Board's action
in telling a labor union (a private organization) how to perform its
functions. My concurrence is largely upon the basis of expediting the
remedy in a case of clear fault, rather than approving the method em-
ployed, which I recognize could be most destructive of unions if carried
forward to any extent by the Board.
As stated above, the Board also held in Local 1367 that the
duty of fair representation was included in the union's duty to bargain
83. The Board indicated its refusal to acquiesce in the Second Circuit's Miranda Fuel 11
rejection, stating: "With due deference to the circuit court's opinion, we adhere to our previous
decision until such time as the Supreme Court of the United State, rules otherwise." li at
898 n.7.
84. Id. at 898.
85. Again, Members Leedom, Brown, and Jenkins composed the majority, and Former
Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning dissented from the § 8(b)(l)(A) finding but agreed
with a violation of § 8(b)(2) to the extent that the work distribution and no-doubling arrange-
ments were based upon considerations of local union membership.
86. NLRB v. Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.). cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 837 (1966). Chief Judge Hutcheson dissented, and Senior District Judge Choate
concurred.
87. 368 F.2d at 1010 (Choate, J., concurring). See NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 1581
(Manchester Terminal Corp.), 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974),
enforcing 196 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1972), in which the court upheld the Board's finding that the
union violated § 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) by giving hiring hall preference bised upon citizenship and
the national residence of the employee's family. The Board's decision was not in fact predi-
cated upon a Miranda Fuel rationale, but the court found support for its holding in Miranda
Fuel and again endorsed the doctrine.
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collectively under sections 8(b)(3) and 8(d) of the Act.S The Board
found that a union's section 8(b)(3) bargaining duty ran not only to
the employer but to the bargaining unit employees as well. The Board
stated:
We hold that under the National Labor Relations Act a labor or-
ganization's duty to bargain collectively includes the duty to represent
fairly as that duty has been enunciated in the line of cases of which
Steele v. L & N Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 (1944) was the first. Section 8(d)
speaks, inter alia, of a mutual obligation of employers and unions "to
confer in good faith" and to sign "any agreement reached." These
quoted phrases contemplate, in our opinion, only lawful bargaining and
agreements, for the statute does not sanction the execution of agreements
which are unlawful. Because collective-bargaining agreements which
discriminate invidiously are not lawful under the Act, the good-faith
requirements of Section 8(d) necessarily protect employees from infringe-
ment of their rights; and both unions and employers are enjoined by the
Act from entering into contractual terms which offend such rights.
Contrary to the Trial Examiner, Section 8(d) cannot mean that a union
can be exercising good faith toward an employer while simultaneously
acting in bad faith toward employees in regard to the same matters.
Section 8(d), as all other provisions of the Act, was written in the public
interest, not just in the interest of employers and unions, and it is not in
the public interest for patently invalid provisions to be included in col-
lective labor agreements. We conclude that when a statutory representa-
tive negotiates a contract in breach of the duty which it owes to em-
ployees to represent all of them fairly and without invidious discrimina-
tion, the representative cannot be said to have negotiated the sort of
agreement envisioned by Section 8(d) nor to have bargained in good
faith as to the employees whom it represents or toward the employer. 9
Accordingly, the Board concluded that the union violated section
8(b)(3) by the contractual establishment, maintenance and enforce-
ment of the discriminatory work apportionment provisions.
Since Local 1367, the Board has done little to implement its
novel addition of sections 8(b)(3) and 8(d) to its Miranda Fuel
arsenal. There appears to be nothing in the history of sections
8(b)(3) and 8(d) nor the precedents thereunder that supports such
incorporation of the duty of fair representation, particularly because
88. Section 8(b)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the
provisions of Section 9(a)." Section 8(d) provides in part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reason-
able times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached
if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
See note 64 supra and cases there cited.
89. 148 N.L.RtB. at 899-900.
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section 8(b)(3) essentially represents the counterpart of the employer's
duty to bargain in good faith under section 8(a)(5). Assuming the
validity of the underlying Miranda Fuel rationale as applied to racial
discrimination, for example, the union embodiment of such a prac-
tice in the terms of a contract would logically violate section 8(b)(3).
Yet since sections 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) as construed by the Board are
broad enough to encompass the unlawful provision there seems little
justification for adding the section 8(b)(3) violation.
The NLRB General Counsel recently found 9 that, under Miranda
Fuel, a union composed primarily of black members (Local 1-A)
breached its duty of fair representation in violation of section 8(b)(1)
(A) when it refused to merge with a sister union composed primarily
of white members (Local 1).91 The locals were historically racially
segregated. Local I-A resisted the efforts of the international union
to merge the locals because Local 1-A feared it would lose its voice
and effectiveness as part of a merged organization. In the General
Counsel's view:
[B]y refusing to merge, Local I-A is acting in derogation of the long term
interests of its members and has thus breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation. By continuing its separate existence, Local I-A has deprived
its members of the opportunity to obtain more and higher-paying jobs.
Moreover, by maintaining a largely segregated menmbership, Local I-A
is acting at odds with the policy embedded in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.92
Further, the NLRB General Counsel has taken the position that,
under Miranda Fuel, a union has an affirmative obligation to attempt
to correct or rectify racial discrimination in employment. 93 Thus,
in one case the General Counsel concluded that a union violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) by refusing the employer's offer to rectify past
90. Section 10(b) of the Act vests the Board or its agent with broad discretionary power
with respect to the issuance of unfair labor practice complaints. NLRB v. Indiana & Michigan
Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 9, 18 (1943). Section 3(d) confers this power upon the General Counsel
of the Board, and provides that he shall have "final authority, on *, half of the Board, in re-
spect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints before the Board," See NLRB
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214 (1st Cir.), cert,
denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972), and cases there cited. Because the General Counsel plays a
major role not only in the enforcement but also in the formulation and development of na-
tional labor policy, his determinations are highly relevant to any meaningful analysis of NLRA
doctrine. And, of course, the General Counsel does, in fact, adjuc icate unfair labor practice
claims whenever he declines to issue a complaint. NLRB v. Setrs, Roebuck & Co,, 421
U.S. 132, 141, 148 (1975).
91. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1977] 94 LAB. REt.. REP. (BNA) 154, 157-159.
92. Id. at 158. The General Counsel also authorized a complaint in the case on the ra-
tionale of Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n (Owens-Illinois, Inc.), 210 N.LRB, 943
(1974), enforced, 520 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1975), that maintenance of separate locals segregated
by race, as with the segregation based on sex in Owens-Illinois, viclated § 8(b)(1)(A) because
racial separation tended to generate a feeling of inferiority among Local I-A members as to
their work status, and, in fact, limited them to fewer and lower-paying jobs.
93. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1975] LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (E.NA) 24649.
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racial discrimination in its hiring policies.94 In the General Counsel's
view, "the exclusive bargaining representative under Section 9(a) of
the Act has an affirmative obligation to seek to correct it, at least to
the extent of accepting the Employer's offer to rectify it where such
acceptance will not conflict with the contract, an outstanding arbitra-
tion award, or prejudice the rights of other employees in the unit.' 95
The General Counsel concluded that even if it could not be proven at
trial that racial discrimination existed, nevertheless the disproportion
of blacks to whites in the unit showed that there was prima facie merit
to the employee's complaint to the union that racial discrimination did
exist. Therefore, said the General Counsel, "where the employer
makes an effort to correct that which appears prima facie to be dis-
crimination, the union's failure to accept the employer's offer was con-
sidered to be at odds with the Union's section 9(a) obligation of fair
representation and, in consequence, a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act."9
6
As a matter of social policy, one can hardly criticize the Board's
application of the Miranda Fuel doctrine in the racial discrimination
context. The essential question remaining, however, is not the desir-
ability of what the Board is achieving, but the legal propriety of its
action within the scope of the limited charter given it by the NLRA.
B. Sex Discrimination
In Owens-Illinois97 the Board found that the union violated sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) by maintaining separate locals whose memberships
were determined solely upon the basis of sex, by separately processing
grievances of male and female unit members, and by refusing to pro-
cess grievances because of the unit members' sex. Three members of
94. Id.
95. Id. at 248.
96. Id. at 249. The General Counsel also stated:
While it may be argued that the E.E.O.C. has been directly charged with implementa-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, this was not viewed as ousting the Board from
enforcing the Union's obligations to unit employees under 9(a) and 8(b) of the Act. In
this regard, the Board had indicated that, in enforcing the NLRA, it would take into
account other Federal policies.
Id See Carpenters Local 22 (Graziano Constr. Co.), 195 N.L.R.B. 1, 2 n.5; Emporium CapweU
Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 69-73 (1975). In one case, the General
Counsel took the position that a union does not violate § 8(bXl)XA) when it gives hiring hall
referral preference to minority applicants in order to assist employers in meeting their affirma-
tive action obligations. The General Counsel found that the disparate treatment based on the
usually unlawful criterion of race was permissible because in effect required by governmental
agencies, as well as serving the legitimate union interests of furthering "the national good of
affording minorities equal employment opportunity" and preserving employment opportunities
for all registrants by decreasing the possibility that employers would lose government con-
tracts. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1977] 96 LAn. REL REP. (BNA) 1, 7.
97. Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n (Owens-Illinois, Inc.), 210 N.L.R.B. 943 (1974),
enforced, 520 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975). See Bell & Howell Co., 230 N.L.R.B. No. 57,95 LR.R.M.
1333 (1977).
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the Board (Former Chairman Miller and Members Fanning and Jen-
kins) were of the view that separate but equal treatment based upon
sex was as invalid as such treatment based upon race. Relying upon
Brown v. Board of Education,98 the majority found that in both areas
separation in and of itself connotes and creates inequalities.99 The
extent to which the decision rests upon Miranda Fuel is not clear, al-
though Chairman Miller expressed the view that the violation arose
out of the union's failure to fairly represent the employees and that
separate but equal representation is not fair representation within the
meaning of Miranda Fuel. Thereafter, in Pacific Maritime Associa-
tionl°° the Board adopted without comment the decision of the admin-
istrative law judge that held that a union breached its duty of fair
representation by refusing to register and dispatch women based upon
the irrelevant, invidious, and unfair consideration of their sex.' 0'
98. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
99. The Board reasoned as follows:
Separate but equal treatment on the basis of sex is as self-contradictory as separate
but equal on the basis of race. In both areas separation in and of itself connotes and
creates inequalities. Not only can separating females from males solely because of
sex generate a feeling of inferiority among the females as to their work status, since
the policy of separation is usually interpreted as reflecting th, inferiority of the fe-
males, but also it can . . . adversely affect the working conditions of both groups solely
because of the difference in sex.
• . . [A] grievance affects both male and female employee., regardless of which
Local processes the grievance, the employees whose Local did not process a grievance
merely because of the grievant's sex are nonetheless bound by the outcome of the other
Local's processing of the grievance. These employees have, tberefore, solely because
of sex, been denied a voice in the resolution of matters affecting their working condi-
tions.
210 N.L.R.B. at 943-44.
Member Penello concurred on the ground that there was an actual nexus between the
discriminatory conduct and interference with employees' § 7 right,. In his view there was a
direct relationship between the separate processing of male and female grievances based upon
sex and the employees' § 7 right to have a voice in the processing of grievances whose outcome
would affect terms and conditions of employment.
Member Kennedy concurred in part and dissented in part. In his view the separate
processing of grievances violated § 8(b)(1)(A) but the maintenance of separate locals did not
because the contract applied equally to all employees regardless of sex or local membership
and no distinction had been made in grievance handling. Member Kennedy regarded the
majority opinion as inconsistent with Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973), enforced per
curiam, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), which held that employer discimination based upon race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin standing alone is not inherently destructive of § 7 rights,
and that there must be actual evidence of a nexus between the alleged discriminatory conduct
and § 7 rights. But cf United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB.. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C Cir,),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969) (employer discrimination aganst black and Latin American
employees in working conditions constituted a § 8(a)(l) violation).
100. 209 N.L.R.B. 519 (1974).
101. Member Fanning, concurring, did not rely on the Miranda Fuel rationale but on the
reasons stated in Operating Eng'rs Local 18 (Ohio Contractors Ass'n), 204 N.L.R.B. 681 (1973),
remanded, 496 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir. 1974), dec. on remand, 220 N.LRB. 147 (1975), enforce-
ment denied, 555 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1977), and in his separate opinion in International Bhd, of
Painters (W. J. Siebenoller, Jr., Paint Co.), 205 N.L.R.B. 651, 652-53 n.4. In the International
Union of Operating Engineers case, the Board stated as follows regarding § 8(b)(2):
When a union prevents an employee from being hired or causes an employee's dis-
charge, it has demonstrated its influence over the employee and its power to affect his
livelihood in so dramatic a way that we will infer-or, if you please, adopt a presumption
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The NLRB General Counsel has taken the position that a union
breaches its duty of fair representation under Miranda Fuel by being
party to a sexually discriminatory health insurance plan that provided
pregnancy coverage for wives of male employees but not for female
employees. 10 2  In one case, the collective bargaining agreenient sim-
ply provided that the employer should maintain hospital and major
medical coverage. The employer had independently obtained the plan
from an insurance carrier.1 3  Upon inquiry of a pregnant female em-
ployee concerning payment of her medical bills related to pregnancy,
the union advised the employee it would look into the matter. The
employee was denied coverage and filed an unfair labor practice
charge. The General Counsel found sex discrimination because grant-
ing pregnancy coverage to wives of male employees but not to female
employees could impact negatively upon female employees who, un-
like male employees, would be financially responsible for payment of
all medical bills related to pregnancies within their families. In the
General Counsel's view, the union breached its duty of fair represen-
tation because its acquiescence in the employer's maintenance of dis-
criminatory terms and conditions of employment constituted arbitrary
and invidious treatment of employees.
Thus, a Section 9(a) statutory representative has an obligation not to be
a party, by agreement or acquiescence, to a sexually discriminatory em-
ployment practice. And particularly where an affected employee has re-
quested Union action to remedy the discrimination and the Union fails
to take any remedial action, the Union arguably breaches its statutory
obligation.'o'
that-the effect of its action is to encourage union membership on the part of all
employees who have perceived that exercise of power. But the inference may be over-
come, or the presumption rebutted, not only where the interference with employment
was pursuant to a valid union-security clause, but also in instances tAhere the facts
show that the union action was necessary to the effective performance of its function
of representing its constituency.
204 N.L.R.B. at 681. One might question whether or not the Board's § 8(b)(2) analysis not only
remains inconsistent with Local 357, but also improperly resurrects the discarded Pacific
Intermountain Express doctrine. See notes 45-51 supra and accompanying text.
Member Jenkins, concurring, agreed with the majoritys reliance upon the Miranda Fuel
rationale, but also found that there was a nexus between the unions' conduct and the em-
ployees' § 7 rights which would further support the finding of a § 8tb)l)(A) violation.
102. NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1977] 95 LAB. REL REp. (BNA) 81, 88-89.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 89. The Gineral Counsel found that the situation was distinguishable from
one in which the employer alone discriminates on the basis of se. Jubilee Mfg. Co.. 202
N.L.R.B. 272 (1973), enforced per curiam, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), holds that such con-
duct standing alone does not violate the NLRA. The General Counsel also distinguished
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), in which the Court found no violation of
Title'VlI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the exclusion of pregnancy benefits from an
employee disability plan, on the ground that, unlike General Electric, the case before him
involved a plan that was worth more in receivable benefits to male employees than to female
employees. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 98 S. CL 347 (1977).
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C. Exercise of Section 7 Rights
The Board has found that unions have violated the duty of fair
representation in a variety of situations in which the unions' actions
are essentially based upon or in retaliation against employee activities
protected by section 7. Thus, for example, the union may not base its
action upon such irrelevant or invidious considerations as the unit em-
ployee's nonmembership in the union, t1 5 the unit employee's intra-
union activity, t1 6 nor the unit employee's having filed charges with
the Board or other agencies.1°7
D. Merger and Political Expediency
The Board has also held that a union breaches its duty of fair
representation when its discriminatory actions are predicated upon the
basis of political expendiency. In Red Ball Motor Freight Inc.,.. for
example, the Board found that one of two unions competing in an
105. Eg., Machinists Local 697 (H.O. Canfield Rubber Co.), 223 N.LR.B. 832 (1976)
(refusal to process the grievance of a nonmember unit employee unle,,s he paid the union the
costs it incurred in processing the grievance where no similar fees were required of members);
Typographical Union Local 122 (Kalamazoo Gazette), 193 N.L.R.I3. 1065 (1971) (causing
members to ostracize employee because of her past nonunion status and antiunion activity
under employment elsewhere); Port Drum Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 555 (1968) (refusal to arbitrate
because of the unit employees' nonmembership in the union). For gurthcr examples of the
operation of this principle in Board decisions, see Local 2088, IBEW (Fed. Elce, Corp,), 218
N.L.R.B. 396, 402 (1975); IBEW Local 1504 (W. Elec. Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 580 (1974); Truck
Drivers Local 807, 207 N.L.R.B. 259 (1973), enforcement denied, 506 F.2d 1382 (2nd Cir.
1974); Teamsters Local 186 (United Parcel Serv.), 203 N.L.R.B. 799 (1973), enforced in part
sub nom. NLRB v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir 1975); UAW
Local 1303 (Jervis Corp.), 192 N.L.R.B. 966 (1971); Lodge 656, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers
(Combustion Eng'r, Inc.), 188 N.L.R.B. 865 (1971).
106. E.g., Teamsters Local 886 (Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.), 229 N.L.R.B. No. 132,
95 L.R.R.M. 1137 (1977) (threat to cause discharge if employee persisted in protesting intra-
union election); Local 485, IUE (Automotive Plating Corp.), 170 N.,L.R.B. 1234 (1968) (re-
fusal to process grievance because employee had criticized union business manager at union
meeting), enforced in part, 454 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1972). See Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
(Explo, Inc.), 229 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 95 L.R.R.M. 1202 (1977); Newspaper Guild Local 26
(Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc.), 220 N.L.R.B. 79 (1975); Pacific Intermountain Express Co.,
215 N.L.R.B. 588 (1974); E.L. Mustee & Sons, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 203 (1974); Architectural
Prods. Div., H.H. Robertson Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 637, 642 (1974); Alcoa Constr. Systems, Inc.,
212 N.L.R.B. 452 (1974); Sargent Elec. Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 630 (1974); United Rubber Workers
Local 374 (Uniroyal, Inc.), 205 N.L.R.B. 117 (1973).
107. E.g., King Soopers, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1976) (refusa, to arbitrate because
employee has filed charges with the Board); Local 624, Plumbers (Power Piping Co.), 211
N.L.R.B. 942 (1974) (refusing use of hiring hall to "travelers" because vhey had filed charges
with the Board); Teamsters Local 186 (United Parcel Serv.), 203 N.L.R.B. 799 (1973) (threat
to deny representation to members if they invoked Board processes; remedy included order to
arbitrate and payment of counsel fees), enforced in part, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1975). See
Longshoremen's Local 814 (West Gulf Maritime Ass'n), 215 N.L.R.B. 459 (1974); Typographical
Union Local 6 (Artintype, Inc.), 213 N.L.R.B. 925 (1974); Architectural Prods. Div., N.H.
Robertson Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 637 (1974); Local 703, Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters (Dominick's Finer
Foods, Inc.), 188 N.L.R.B. 873 (1971), enforced, 81 L.R.R.M. 2488 (7th Cir. 1972); NLRB
Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1975] LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) 246-49.
108. 157 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1966), enforced sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB,
379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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election among employees of a merged operation violated section
8(b)(1)(A) by promising to give its members, the numerically larger
number of voters, seniority over members of the competing union.
The promise was based solely upon the union's political motive of
winning the election and not upon objective factors relevant to the
merger problems or involving the merits of dovetailing. 10
9
The D.C. Circuit enforced the Board's order,110 agreeing that the
threatened action would violate the union's duty of fair representation
and that such a threat was itself a violation. The court found that the
promise of illegal action combined with the illegal promise impairing
the employees' freedom of choice violated section 8(b)(1)(A).
Section 7 ... is instinct with the idea of free choice. If it means any-
thing at all, it is that employees shall not be subjected to improper pres-
sures or influences in their selection of a union to represent them. On
this record the Board has found on adequate evidence that UTE arbi-
trarily adopted and announced a bargaining policy on seniority merger
motivated only by a desire to win the votes of a majority of the employees
at the Airport Drive terminal. The actual effectuation of that policy
would, under the circumstances, constitute a default by UTE in its obli-
gation to represent fairly all the employees in the unit for which it be-
comes the exclusive bargaining representative.'"I
The court noted that merger situations involve difficult problems of rec-
onciling the conflicting interests of previously independent groups of
employees, and that many solutions have been tried. However, the
court recognized that while it was not its function to prefer any one
solution it was clear that the union had renounced any good faith ef-
fort to reconcile the group's interests. The union had failed to proffer
any reason for preferential treatment of one group "other than the
purely political motive of winning an.election.""
109. The trial examiner, whose decision was adopted by the Board, stated that:
[Tihe promised action in this case does not reflect the kind of compromise between
competing interests which collective bargaining daily requires, but would serve the
interests of UTE and the majority of the employees in the unit it sought to repre-
sent with hostility to those of the minority. I find that in the circumstances of this case
and in the absence of any demonstrated reasonable basis for the discrimination UTE
proposed to practice against the Abbey Street employees, it promised to take action
following certification which would have been unlawful under Miranda Fuel... and
therefore violated Section 8(bXl)(A).
157 N.L.R.B. at 1245 (emphasis added).
110. Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
I1l. Id. at 144-45.
112. Id. at 143. The court commented that:
The merger situation poses notoriously difficult problems in accommodating the interests
of theretofore independent groups of employees. It frequently, although by no means
invariably in an expanding economy, raises the dread spectre of job-loss for workers
with relatively long records of stable employment. Many different formulae for
reconciliation have been attempted, and more have been suggested, as methods for
alleviating the discord over seniority when two groups of employees are joined. But
it seems clear to us, as it did to the Board on the undisputed evidence before it, that
UTE has renounced any good faith effort to reconcile the interests of the employees
formerly at the Abbey Street depot with those at the Airport Drive terminal. It
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The court noted further that treating such a breach of the duty of
fair representation as an unfair labor practice presented a substantial
legal question, but generally endorsed the Board's Miranda Fuel II
doctrine. The court stated:
[T]he standards to be applied in determining what union acts of commis-
sion or omission are in violation of its duty of fair representation under
the Act remain largely to be drawn. Only recently has the Board begun
to articulate the characteristics of unfair representation as it has begun
more actively to entertain complaints of this nature. On the narrow
question before us, we need not concern ourselves with what may even-
tually prove to be the precise contours of a union's duty fairly to repre-
sent all of the employees for whom it speaks, for there are cases which
indicate that union action taken solely for the considerations of political
expediency, and unsupported by any rational argument whatsoever, is in
violation of representational responsibilities13
Similarly, in Barton Brands Ltd.,"4 the Board held that union action
predicated solely upon partisan political reasons breaches the duty of
fair representation. A union officer rejected a dovetailing arrangement
in a merger situation and created an endtailing arrangement in order
to win votes for union office. The Board found violations of sections
8(b)(2), (1)(A), 8(a)(3), and (1), stating:
We cannot agree with the Administrative Law Judge when he sanctions
the union conduct here on the theory that union officials like politicians
must take action to curry favor with the majority of employees in order
to insure their reelection and that a candidate for office cannot prevail un-
less he convinces a majority of the electorate to support him. An
elected union official doubtless has a need to develop and to maintain his
constituency, like any politician in any other context. However, as a
union official, he is under a statutory duty to see that all employees are
fairly represented, and he may not lawfully violate that duty by causing
interference in the employment relationship of any employees in the unit
upon arbitrary grounds solely to advance his own personal political am-
bition within the Union."15
The Board has thus made clear a number of proscribed reasons
for union conduct that will constitute a breach of the duty of fair
representation. Union action motivated by political considerations as
raised no questions with respect to the merits of dovetailing, such as that some jobs are
more difficult of execution or require more training than others. There has been an
indication that the Abbey Street operation was unsuccessful and that its employees, had
they not followed the work to Airport Drive, would have lost their jobs altogether.
UTE has, in sum, failed to come forward with any reason at all for preferring Airport
Drive employees other than the purely political motive of winn.ng an election by a
promise of preferential representation to the numerically larger number of votcrs,
Id. at 142-43. See generally Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (190A), discussed in notes 67
and 68 supra.
113. 379 F.2d at 142.
114. 213 N.L.R.B. 640 (1974), enforcement denied, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976).
115. Id. at 641-42.
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well as that predicated on race and sex discrimination is proscribed
under the Miranda Fuel doctrine.
E. Unexplained Union Action
Union conduct based upon no reason has also been found viola-
tive of the unfair labor practices provisions by the Board. Thus, in
General Truck Drivers, Local 315 (Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd.),116 the
Board held that, at the least, a union must have a reason for the action
that it takes, and absent a reason the conduct will be deemed arbitrary
and in breach of the union's duty of fair representation in violation
of section 8(b)(1)(A). The Board stated:
The prohibition of decisionmaking supported by no reason, as well as
decisionmaking for impermissible reasons, is a modest enough begin-
ning for us. Although an employer may discharge an employee for no
reason at all without violating the Act, we held in Miranda Fuel that
unions have obligations to employees they represent that employers do
not. And if a duty to avoid arbitrary conduct, as part of an affirmative,
fiduciary responsibility, means anything, it must mean at least that there
be a reason for action taken. Sometimes the reason will be apparent,
sometimes not. When it is not the circumstances may be such that we
will have no choice but to deem the conduct arbitrary if the union does
not tell us what it is. 117
The Board further found that the union breached its duty of fair rep-
resentation when, following a layoff, it submitted to majority vote of
the unit employees the question of layoff reassignment rights, despite
the existence of a contractual provision that already clearly defined
those rights."" Thus, according to the Board, the union wrongfully
delegated to a group of its members its duty of fair and impartial treat-
ment. The method used, the referendum, did not meet the minimum
statutory standard of fairness. The Board was troubled by several
aspects of the referendum: while only dump truck drivers were in-
cluded in the announced layoff, the ballot covered other employees as
well; the ballot did not adequately describe the contractual bumping
provision; what information the voters had with which to evaluate the
matter was unclear; there was no evidence that affected employees
had been allowed to make their views known to the voting employees;
the vote was not taken until after the layoff was announced; and there
was an inherent conflict of interest because those voting would be ad-
versely affected by a vote to permit bumping. The Board stated that:
"The duty of fair representation being an affirmative duty, the obliga-
tions it encompasses cannot be avoided by delegating the authority
116. 217 N.L.R.B. 616 (1975), enforced, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976).
117. 217 N.L.R.B. at 618.
118. Id. at 616-17. See Kling v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1975).
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to make decisions." 19  The Board noted that while the union could
have applied the contract in a way that would have defeated the em-
ployee's bumping right, the violation lay in the lack of fairness of the
decision-making process. "Implicit in Miranda Fuel is the idea that
a union breaches its fiduciary duty when it deprives some employees
of their clear contractual rights because a majority of its members
want it to.' 120  The Board noted that even in prccontract negotiation
situations, where the employees rights are not yet established, the
union breaches its duty when it pits a majority group against a mi-
nority as a basis for its bargaining position in order to win political
advantage.12  The Board stated that it might have been permissible
for the union to submit to majority vote prospectively the question
whether the contractual mutual bumping benefit:s should operate in
general. The Board stated generally:
The duty of fair representation was conceived as a protection for em-
ployees faced with the reduction of their individua( rights correspond-
ing with the grant of power to unions to act as their exclusive collective
bargaining representatives. Since its conception this duty "has stood
as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals
stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor
law" [citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967)]. Were it held power-
less to protect the employee in this case where the Union permitted, in
the exercise of its power, what would be only a slight exaggeration to
call a mockery of fair procedures, this bulwark will have proved to be as
illusory as the Maginot Line. We find that by the manner in which Re-
spondent Union undertook to prevent Holman from being reassigned it
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.122
Assuming arguendo that the breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion is an unfair labor practice, application of the doctrine to invali-
date union action predicated upon such invidious grounds as race and
sex is clearly within the scope of the doctrine as developed by the
courts since Steele. Union action based upon such grounds certainly
is encompassed in the Vaca standards of arbitrary, discriminatory, or
119. 217 N.L.R.B. at 619.
120. Id.
121. See Barton Brands, Ltd., 213 N.L.R.B. 640 (1974), enforcenent denied, 529 F.2d 793
(7th Cir. 1976); Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1966), enforced, 379 F.2d
137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
122. 217 N.L.R.B. at 619. Member Penello dissented. He found no evidence of arbi-
trary application of the contract provision, nor of hostile motivation, but rather that the union
was acting out of a legitimate concern for other unit employees. While it might have been
better to decide the matter prior to a layoff, he believed the union d d the next best thing, and
that there was no violation by submitting the matter to majority vote. He stated:
The majority has, in my opinion, substituted speculation for proof that Holman was
deprived of his right to participate fully and fairly in the determination of the issue.
It has improperly shifted the burden to the Union to prove that its procedures were
fair, and has intruded into the internal workings of the Union beyond the point which
wisdom and precedent would have dictated.
217 N.L.R.B. at 621.
[Vol. 38:807
MIRANDA FUEL
bad faith conduct. Similarly, action based on irrelevant political rea-
sons would seem to be tantamount to hostile or bad faith conduct. Use
of the doctrine by the Board to review and set aside union actions
based upon less extreme grounds, however, such is disagreement with
union contract or rule interpretation, or dissatisfaction with the ade-
quacy of union justification, does not comport with the stringent Vaca
standards.
III. EXTENSION OF THE Miranda Fuel DOCTRINE TO QUALITY
OF REPRESENTATION
At one point in its history the Board held.that "[t]he Act pro-
tects employees from discrimination by their bargaining representa-
tive, but does not guarantee the quality of the representation they
receive."123  Nevertheless, in the course of applying the Miranda Fuel
doctrine, the Board has expanded it to encompass several aspects of
the quality of representation accorded employees by a union.
A. Representation of the Employee-Grievant
Under its expanded Miranda Fuel doctrine, the Board has held
that while a union may lawfully exercise its discretion in refusing to
process a grievance or take a case to arbitration,124 once the union
decides to do so it must represent the grievant fully and fairly and act
as the grievant's advocate.
In Truck Drivers Local 705 (Associated Transport),125 for ex-
ample, the union's agent openly stated at a joint grievance committee
meeting that he did not believe the grievant had a valid grievance.
The union agent was found by the Board to have breached his duty
of fair representation by abdicating his duty to present the grievance
in the light most favorable to the grievant. The Board stated:
In our view, once Respondent undertook to present Aaron Kesner's
grievance to the Joint Grievance Board, it became obligated to represent
him fully and fairly. This obligation included the duty to act as advocate
for the grievant, which here Heim clearly did not do. To the contrary,
by saying that he did not believe Aaron Kesner's claim was valid, Helm
undermined Kesner's case before the Joint Grievance Board.
126
The Seventh Circuit enforced the Board's order,12 7 expressing its
view of the statutory basis for Miranda Fuel as follows:
123. Maxam Dayton, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 396, 418 (1963).
124. Eg., Retail Clerks Local 3157 (Lit Bros.), 192 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1971). "A labor
organization is not required automatically to process a grievance of a unit employee. If, in
good faith, it believes that the grievance is without merit, it may refuse to entertain it without
running afoul of its duty of fair representation." Carpenters Local 1104 (The Law Co.), 215
N.L.R.B. 537 (1974).
125. 209 N.L.R.B. 292 (1974), enforced, 532 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1976).
126. Id. at 292. See P.P.G. Indus., 229 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 95 L.R.R.M. 1366 (1977).
127. Truck Drivers Local 705 v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1976).
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As the Fifth Circuit observed in United Rubber Workers Local 12 v.
N.L.R.B., 368 F.2d 12 . . . the language of section 8(b)(1)(A), unlike
certain other provisions of section 8, is not restricted to discrimination
which encourages or discourages union membership. While we would
have difficulty in saying that a union's failure to act vigorously as an
advocate in presenting a grievant's position when it had undertaken to do
so would be unrelated to an employee's union membership and activi-
ties, we do not propose, in any event to read into the statute language
which the Congress did not put there.
Similarly, in United Steelworkers (InterRoyal Corp.),'29 the Board
held that the union breached its duty of fair representation when at
the initial step of a grievance it peremptorily refused to consider cer-
tain evidence tendered by the grievant in support of her case. The
Board said that the union had a duty to act as the grievant's advo-
cate, and this duty was not met by refusing the grievant's explanation
and attempt at proof. According to the Board: "We need find no duty
on the Respondent's part to pursue the proof of Beshears' grievance;
they rejected her attempt to provide that proof. And it is patently
irrelevant that the proof Beshears had in hand on March 24 might not
have fully satisfied the Employer-it was not even considered by the
Respondents."'
30
In Truck Drivers Local 692 (Great Western Unifreight System),' 31
the Board introduced the proposition that negligence is not a breach
of the duty of fair representation, and to that extent appeared to es-
tablish some limit on the Miranda Fuel doctrine. In that case, the
union advised a discharged employee that the employee had a meri-
torious grievance under the contract. Accordingly, the employee
filled out a grievance form and left it at the union office. Because the
union failed to present the grievance to the employer within the
contractual time limits, the employer took the position that the griev-
ance was untimely and lacking in merit. In support of his section
8(b)(1)(A) complaint, the General Counsel contended that the failure to
file and process the grievance in a reasonable and timely fashion was
attributable to the negligence of the union business agent and that
this. negligence fell squarely within the definition of "arbitrary" under
Miranda Fuel 11.132 The Board rejected this contention on the ground
that it would not equate "mere negligence" 33 with irrelevant, invidi-
128. Id. at 1174.
129. 223 N.L.R.B. 1184 (1976).
130. Id. at 1185.
131. 209 N.L.R.B. 446 (1974).
132. The General Counsel cited BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) as defining
"arbitrary" to mean "done capriciously or at pleasure; without adequate determining principle;
not founded in the nature of things; nonrational; not done or acting according to reason,"
209 N.L.R.B. 447 n.4.
133. 209 N.L.R.B. at 447.
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ous, or unfair considerations that it had defined as arbitrary con-
duct in Miranda Fuel II The Board stated:
[I]t is clear that negligent action or nonaction of a union by itself will
not be considered to be arbitrary, irrelevant, invidious, or unfair so as to
constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation violative of thd Act.
Something more is required. In the instant case, the modified complaint
merely alleges only that the Respondent negligently failed and refused to
timely process the meritorious grievance to the serious detriment of the
Charging Party. Nothing more is charged. Absent an allegation
showing something more than negligence alone, we conclude that the
negligent conduct of the Respondent alleged herein does not constitute
by itself a breach of the duty of fair representation in violation of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 34
The Board has found, however, that a union breaches its duty of
fair representation when it handles a grievance in a perfunctory man-
ner. When a union summarily accepts an employer's uncorroborated
assertions or shifting employer reasons concerning a grievant's con-
duct, fails to consult with the grievant,135 or fails to investigate and
consult with the employer concerning a grievance, 136 the Board may
find the union's conduct perfunctory. Deliberate concealment of
material facts is clearly regarded as inconsistent with the duty.1
37
Conversely, the Board apparently will not find a violation when its
review of the record satisfies it that the union has "pursued the
grievances not only adequately but also with energy" and has "vigor-
ously and diligently represented the grievants. ' '3
134. Id. at 448. Member Fanning reiterated his general disagreement with Miranda Fuel,
stating.
I am of the view that a union should be accorded a reasonable amount of discretion in
the exercise of its representative function. If every intraunion resolution of a question
concerning seniority or grievance were subject to an over-the-shoulder appraisal by the
Board for fairness, the burden on unions and the Board ultimately would become
intolerable.
ld. at 449. In his view such words as "irrelevant, invidious or unfair" have no meaning
unless they are translated into the restraint and coercion covered by § 8(bXIXA). For a more
current explication of his disagreement with Miranda Fuel, see Chairman Fanning's comments in
Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1363 n.71 (1977).
135. K-g., Phyllis Whitehead, 224 N.L.R.B. 244 (1977) (the Board stated that it rejected
any implication that the union's duty of fair representation is analogous to that owed by an at-
torney to a client and stated, rather, that the duty was analogous to that between legislator and
constituent).
136. K-g., Western Exterminator Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1282 (1976); Newspaper Guild
Local 26 (Buffalo-Courier Express, Inc.), 220 N.L.R.B. 79, 89 (1975); E.L. Mustee & Sons, 215
N.L.R.B. 203 (1974).
137. K-g., Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 588, 598 (1974).
138. Teamsters Local 542 (Golden Hill Convalescent Hosp.), 223 N.L.R.B. 533, 533 (1976).
The Board there even reviewed the extent to which the union objected to the introduction of
adverse testimony at the arbitration hearing. Compare the sixth amendment standards for
determining effective assistance of counsel. See 37 Oiiio ST. L.J. 927 (1976). Board remedies
for breach of the duty of fair representation include cease and desist orders, back pay, orders to
process and arbitrate grievances, and orders to furnish and pay for independent counsel. For a
summary of existing and potential remedies for a union's breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion, see Irving, Remedies and Compliance-Putting More Teeth Into the Act, LAn. L DE%. 349,
404-06 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1977). See also Teamsters Local 282 (Explo, Inc.),
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B. Contractual Union Security Agreements
In the area of contractual union security agreements, the Board
has expressly held that the union has an affirmative obligation to in-
form unit employees of their obligations under the contract, at least
prior to taking adverse action against an employee because of non-
compliance with the contract obligations.13 9  A requirement of fair
dealing owed by a union to employees under union security agree-
ments encompasses the duty to inform the employee of the employee's
rights and obligations under such an agreement in order that the em-
ployee can take whatever steps might be necessary to protect his job.
In IUE Local 801 v. NLRB,140 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld the Board's finding that the union's refusal of a valid
tender of dues, causing the employer to discharge the employee,
violated section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A). The court found that a union has
a duty to inform unit employees of their obligations under contractual
union security agreements. Echoing the rationale that the Board ap-
plies in these cases, the court stated:
Among the most important of labor standards imposed by the Act as
amended is that of fair dealing, which is demanded of unions in their
dealings with employees. . . .The requirement of fair dealing between
a union and its members is in a sense fiduciary in nature and arises out
of two factors. One is the degree of dependence of the individual
employee on the union organization; the other, a corollary of the first,
is the comprehensive power vested in the union with respect to the
individual. . . .The requirement of fair dealing is not limited to union
members; when an individual becomes an employee of a company having
a union security clause in its contract the new employee is not free to
join or refuse to join a union, nor does he have a voice in the selection
of his bargaining representative. He takes the existing union and its
contract in effect as one of the conditions of his employment. From the
beginning of his employment, the union which can require his member-
ship or command his discharge is therefore charged with an obligation
of fair dealing which includes the duty to inform the employee of his
229 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 95 L.R.R.M. 1202 (1977); Teamsters Local 186 (United Parcel Serv.), 203
N.L.R.B. 799 (1973), enforced in part, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1975); Local 485, IUE (Automo-
tive Plating Corp.), 170 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1968), enforced in part, 454 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1972); Port
Drum Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 555, 556 (1968).
139. Eg., Typographical Union Local 21, 218 N.L.R.B. 812, 824 (1975). The Board has
delineated the minimum requirements expected of a union as follows:
[A]t the very least, before a union may cause a member's discharge from employment
because of dues arrearage . . . it must meet this "minimum" obligation by giving
reasonable notice of the delinquency, including a statement of the precise amount and
months for which dues were owed, as well as an explanation of the method used in
computing such amount.
Teamsters Local 122, 203 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1041-42 (1973). See, e.g., Local 3036, Taxi Drivers,
204 N.L.R.B. 427, 428-29 (1973); Local 1908, United Transport (Cottrell Bus Scrv.), 199 N.L.R.B,
872, 874 (1972); Allied Maintenance Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 566, 570 (1972); Lodge 946, IAM
(Aerojet-General Corp.), 186 N.L.R.B. 561, 562 (1970); Pacific lion and Metal Co., 175
N.L.R.B. 604 (1969).
140. 307 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 936 (1962), enforcing 129
N.L.R.B. 1379 (1961), 130 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1961).
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rights and obligations so that the employee may take all necessary steps
to protect his job.141
As noted, these cases have arisen in the context of a union's
affirmative obligation to inform employees concerning contract union
security obligations. The Board's rationale, that the duty of fair
representation is essentially a fiduciary one which implies an obliga-
tion of full disclosure, however, seems sufficiently broad to apply to a
wide variety of situations. Both nondisclosure of contractual require-
ments as well as misrepresentation regarding contract terms would
appear to be within the scope of the duty as defined by the Board.1
42
This expansion of the duty of fair representation readily demon-
strates that the Board now sits in review of the quality and adequacy
of union representation, and that its standard of review is stringent.
Rather than starting with a presumption of fairness and regularity,
the Board appears to be placing the burden upon the union to es-
tablish the fairness of its procedures or the thoroughness of its repre-
sentation. The Board has intruded substantially into the internal
processes of the union, and the propriety of its entry remains to be
validated. If standards such as energetic, diligent, and vigorous repre-
sentation are to be imposed, it would seem more appropriate that this
be done by Congress. It does not appear that Congress has done so,143
however, in light of the Supreme Court's examination of legislative
intent in the cases interpreting section 8(b)(1)(A).
IV. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 8(b)(1)(A).
It is readily apparent that the Board has undertaken an increas-
141. 307 F.2d at 683. The court relied, inter alia, upon Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953). The Third Circuit took a similar approach in NLRB v. Hotel Employees'
Local 568 (Sheraton Corp.), 320 F.2d 254, 258 (3d Cir. 1963):
The comprehensive authority vested in the union, as the exclusive agent of the cm-
ployees, leads inevitably to employee dependence on the labor organization. There
necessarily arises out of this dependence a fiduciary duty that the union deal fairly
with employees .... At the minimum, this duty requires that the union inform the
employee of his obligations in order that the employee may take whatever action is
necessary to protect his job tenure.
See-NLRB v. Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 401 F.2d 509, 510 (2d Cir. 1968), enforcing 156
N.L.R.B. 335 (1965), 169 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1963).
142. Stereotypers Local 13 (Denver Post, Inc.), 231 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 96 LR.R.M. 1073
(1977); United Steelworkers (Duval Corp.), 226 N.LR.B. No. 118, 94 LR.R.M. 1239 (1976);
Teamsters Local 671 (Airborne Freight Corp.), 199 N.L.R.B. 994, 999-1000 (1972) (failure to in-
form certain unit employees of the effect of contract proposals, failure to notify certain em-
ployees of a meeting to discuss and vote on contract proposals, misrepresentation to employer
concerning coverage of contract). The NLRB General Counsel took the position in one case
that the Miranda Fuel duty of fair representation requires a union to provide requested rele-
vant information in the union's possession to a unit job applicant who hd reasonable basis to
believe he was being discriminated against in the operation of an exclusive job referral system.
NLRB Gen. Counsel Q. Rep., [1975] LAB. REL. YEARBooK (BNA) 261. See Local 324, Oper-
ating Eng'rs (Associated Gen. Contractors), 226 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 93 LR.R.M. 1416 (1976).
143. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
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ingly major role in the review and supervision of a union's per-
formance of its representative functions. A number of the problems
with Miranda Fuel have already been noted, including the question of
the applicability of section 8(b)(2) in the absence of unlawful union
motivation, and the question of the Board's intrusion into the sub-
stantive bargaining area. In addition, it would seem that a sub-
stantial question exists concerning whether Miranda Fuel is consistent
with the Supreme Court's analysis of section 8(b)(1)(A) in the cases
discussed in the following section.
A. Curtis Brothers and Allis-Chalmers
In 1960, in NLRB v. Drivers Local 639 (Curtis Bros., Inc.), 144
the Court rejected the Board's doctrine that peaceful recognitional
picketing by a minority union constituted restraint or coercion of
employees in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A). In the Board's view,
the object of such picketing was to force an employer to recognize a
union not chosen by a majority of employees and thereby to deprive
employees of their section 7 rights to join or refrain from joining a
union. The Board found- that inherent in the economic pressure
against the employer by the picketing was a threat to employees' job
security, and that this threat tainted peaceful picketing as unlawful
conduct constituting restraint or coercion within the meaning of sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A). The Court, however, held that scetion 8(b)(1)(A) did
not have the broad and general sweep contended by the Board, but
rather that this provision was designed to reach only extreme union
tactics. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
We conclude that the Board's interpretation of § 8(b)(l)(A) finds support
neither in the way Congress structured § 8(b) nor in the legislative history
of § 8(b)(1)(A). Rather it seems clear, and we hold, . . . that § 8(b)(l)
(A) is a grant of power to the Board limited to authority to proceed
against union tactics involving violence, intimidation, and reprisal or
threats thereof-conduct involving more than the general pressures upon
persons employed by the affected employers implicit in economic
strikes.1
45
Mr. Justice Brennan stated further that the "note repeatedly sounded"
throughout the legislative history of section 8(b)(1)(A) concerned
"the necessity for protecting individual workers from union organiza-
tional tactics tinged with violence, duress or reprisal."' 46  He found
that the "central theme" throughout the debates was "the elimination
144. 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
145. Id. at 290.
146. Id. at 286. Mr. Justice Brennan noted that when Senator Ives objected to a pro-
posed amendment to include the wo'ds "interfere with" in § 8(bX1)(A) as too broad, Senator
Taft "insisted that even those words would have a limited application and would reach "repre-
hensible" practices but not methods of peaceful persuasion." Id. (citing 93 CoNo. Rtc. 4016-
17).
(Vol. 38:807
MIRANDA FUEL
of the use of repressive tactics bordering on violence or involving
particularized threats of economic reprisal.
147
Indeed, for many years following the enactment of section 8(b)
(1)(A) as part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments the Board had
also interpreted the section as being of limited application and directed
at means, not ends. In Perry Norvell Co., for example, the Board
analyzed section 8(b)(1)(A) as follows:
Section 8(b)(1)(A) was not intended to have the broad and almost limit-
less reach which the General Counsel urges upon the Board. The legis-
lative history of the Act shows that, by this particular section, Congress
primarily intended to proscribe the coercive conduct which sometimes
accompanies a strike, but not the strike itself. By Section 8(b)(l)(A),
Congress sought to fix the rules of the game, to insure that strikes and
other organizational activities of employees were conducted peaceably
by persuasion and propaganda and not by physical force, or threats of
force, or of economic reprisal. In that Section, Congress was aiming at
means, not ends.1
48
In Curtis Brothers the Court noted that while the Board dismissed such
earlier cases "as 'dubious precedent,'" in the Court's view "they gave
a sounder construction to § 8(b)(1)(A) than the Board's construction
in the present case."
149
In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,'" and in Scofield
v. NLRB,"' the Supreme Court has also held that enforcement of a
valid union rule by imposition of fines does not violate section 8(b)(1)
(A). And in NLRB v. Boeing Co., 152 the Court held that the Board is
not to inquire into the reasonableness of a union fine under section
8(b)(1)(A). The problem in the union fine cases has not been with the
means encompassed under section 8(b)(1)(A), for fines clearly consti-
tute economic coercion, but with the Court's concern over intrusion
into internal union affairs. In Boeing the Court noted that "all fines
are coercive to a greater or lesser degree" and that:
The underlying basis for the holdings of Allis-Chalmers and Scofield
was not that reasonable fines were noncoercive under the language of
§ 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, but was instead that those provisions were not in-
tended by Congress to apply to the imposition by the union of fines not
affecting the employer-employee relationship and not otherwise pro-
hibited by the Act. The reason for this determination, in turn, was that
Congress had not intended by enacting this section to regulate the inter-
147. 362 U.S. at 287.
148. 80 N.L.R1B. 225, 239 (1948) (emphasis in original).
149. 362 U.S. at 291. See Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Ad-
ministrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Mien. L Ry,. 1435,
1511, 1514-17 (1963).
150. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
151. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
152. 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
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nal affairs of unions to the extent that would be required in order to base
unfair labor practice charges on the levying of such fines. 1"
Allis-Chalmers and its progeny, and Curtis Brothers thus reflect both
a limitation on the class of conduct proscribed by section 8(b)(l)(A)
as well as a solicitude for internal union processes.
B. Bernhard-Altman
Standing like Stonehenge somewhere between the detailed and
restrictive analyses of Curtis Brothers and Allis-Chalmers, however,
is the Supreme Court's cursory and vague decision in Garment Work-
ers v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann).154  The Court there held that the
employer violated section 8(a)(1) and (2), and that the union violated
section 8(b)(1)(A), by entering into an exclusive collective bargaining
agreement with a union that represented only a minority of the em-
ployees. The Court found that there could be "no clearer abridg-
ment" of the section 7 rights of employees to select their own bargain-
ing representative or to refrain from such activity than to impose a
minority union as exclusive representative upon a "nonconsenting
majority."' 15  It therefore followed "without need of further demon-
stration" that the employer and the union violated the Act. With
regard to section 8(b)(1)(A) the Court, in an opinion written by Mr.
Justice Clark, stated summarily:
In the Taft-Hartley Law, Congress added § 8(b)(1)(A) to the Wagner Act,
prohibiting, as the Court of Appeals held, "unions from invading the
rights of employees under § 7 in a fashion comparable to the activities of
employers prohibited under § 8(a)(1)." 280 F.2d at 620. It was the in-
tent of Congress to impose upon unions the same restrictions which the
Wagner Act imposed on employers with respect to violation of employee
rights. 156
The Court's only reference to Curtis Brothers was to note that the
court of appeals had distinguished Curtis Brothers on the ground that
the instant case involved neither organizational nor recognitional pick-
eting. 15
7
153. Id. at 73. In NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 318 U.S, 418 (168),
which upheld the Board's finding that a union violated § 8(b)(l)(A) by its expulsion of a member
for filing charges with the Board, the Court gave no real explanaticn why the union's conduct
constituted restraint or coercion within the scope of § 8(b)(l)(A). See generally Craver, The
Boeing Decision: A Blow to Federalism, Individual Rights and Stare Decisis, 122 U. PA. L.
REv. 556 (1974).
154. 366 U.S. 731 (1961). See W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WtTE UNIONS 168 (1977);
Leiken, The Current and Equal Employment Role of the NLRB, 1971 DuKE L.J. 833. 850-55.
155. 366 U.S. at 737.
156. Id. at 737-38.
157. ILGWU v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1960), qff'd, 366 U.S, 731 (1961). The
D.C. Circuit's opinion was written by Mr. Justice Burton, sitting by designation, with whom
Judge Miller joined to comprise the majority. Mr. Justice Burton staled:
The instant cases involve much more direct interference and restraint of § 7 rights than
did the Curtis Bros. case. In the instant cases the recognition of the minority union is
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The Court's pronouncement that section 8(b)(1)(A) has the same
scope as section 8(a)(1) would broaden section 8(b)(l)(A) immea-
surably, for section 8(a)(1) is not limited to restraint or coercion,
much less to violent conduct, duress or reprisals, but covers various
forms of generalized and noncoercive interference as well.' 58 A closer
examination of the substantiation given by the Court for its cryptic
conclusion reveals that conclusion to be extremely questionable. The
Court in Bernhard-Altmann cited, without discussion, four references
from the legislative history as support for its summary statement con-
cerning congressional intent in section 8(b)(1)(A). 5 9 The passages
appear to be of dubious support for the proposition tendered by the
Court. Indeed, they were given very different interpretations in Curtis
Brothers and Allis-Chalmers.
The Court first cites the supplementary views of five members of
the Senate Labor Committee, including Senators Taft and Ball, who
believed that the Senate bill did not go sufficiently far in its regulation
of union organizational tactics, and who introduced an amendment,
analogous to section 8(a)(1), that would have made it an unfair labor
practice for a union "to interfere with, or coerce, employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in § 7." 160 The words "interfere
with" were deleted during debates, and as thus changed the amend-
ment was enacted as section 8(b)(1)(A). As noted above, the Court
in Curtis Brothers analyzed this same report of supplementary views
a fait accompli depriving the majority of the employees of their guaranteed right to
choose their own representative. In the Curtis Bros. case the issue was not whether
the recognition of the minority union as the exclusive bargaining representative Was a
violation of the statute. It was only whether the preliminary picketing seeking to gain
members and recognition was a violation of § 8(b)(l)(A).
Id. at 621. Judge Fahy dissented on the ground that Curtis Bros. was dispositive of the case.
Judge Fahy stated:
The subject was exhaustively considered in Curtis. In the absence of an objective ex-
plicitly condemned by the Act, such as appears in section 8(b)4), peaceful economic
measures were held not to constitute such restraint or coercion of employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed by section 7 as to constitute unfair labor practices
within the meaning of section 8(b)(l)(A). From this it seems to me to follow that
the obtaining of such recognition by peaceful economic measures, unaccompanied by
any unlawful contractual provision, is not an unfair labor practice on the part of the
union under section 8(b)(1)(A).
Id. at 622-23.
158. E-g., NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co.,
375 U.S. 405 (1964); NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); Republic Aia-
tion Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
159. 366 U.S. at 738 n.I. The references pointed to by the Court are: S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., Ist Sess. 50 (Supp. Views) (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGIS.ATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 456 (1948); 93 CoNG. REc. 4432, 4433,
4435 (1947), reprinted in II NLRB, LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEME T RE-
LA-ioNS AcT, 1947, at 1199, 1204, 1207 (1948). The same four references were cited by Mr.
Justice Burton in the lower court opinion in support of his conclusion that § 8(bXIX)A) was
intended to be comparable to § 8(aXl). 280 F.2d 616 at 620-21 n.8, affd, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
160. S. Ra. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (Supp. Views) (1947), reprinted in I
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIO.S AcT, 1947, at 456
(1948).
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and the amendment and found from them that "similar expressions
pervaded the Senate debates on the amendment. The note repeatedly
sounded is as to the necessity for protecting individual workers from
union organizational tactics tinged with violence, duress or reprisal."''
And the Court in Allis-Chalmers analyzed the same statement of views
as reflecting that "[t]he mischief against which the Statement in-
veighed was restraint and coercion by unions in organizational cam-
paigns.'
1 62
The Court's next reference in Bernhard-Altmann to the legislative
history is a statement by Senator Ball during the debates on the
amendment that:
[I]f, as has been charged on this floor-and I think the charge is true-
unions today are using coercive practices in their organization and elec-
tion drives, then it seems to me individual employees in the free exercise
of their rights guaranteed by this act are just as much entitled to pro-
tection from such activities of unions as they are from the same kind of
coercive activities on the part of employers. 
6
Yet in the same statement Senator Ball goes on to say:
That modification [the internal union rules proviso] is designed to make
it clear that we are not trying to interfere with the internal affairs of a
union which is already organized. All we are trying to cover is the co-
ercive and restraining acts of the union in its effort to organize unorga-
nized employees.
164
The appropriate reading of this language would appear to be that of
the Court in Curtis Brothers, namely, that Senator Ball's remarks
were part of the consistent theme that section 8(b)(1)(A) dealt with
union organizational tactics involving violence, duress, or reprisal. 6
The Court in Allis-Chalmers found that the passage was one of many
wherein Senator Ball made clear that the amendment related to union
conduct amounting to restraint and coercion during organizational
campaigns.1
66
The Court in Bernhard-Altmann next cited a statement by Sena-
tor Smith, a co-sponsor of the amendment, that the amendment is de-
signed "to make it balance with exactly the sare provision in sec-
161. 362 U.S. at 286.
162. 388 U.S. at 186 (emphasis in original).
163. 93 CONG. REc. 4432 (1947), reprinted in II NLRB, LIOISLATIVE HISTORY OF lilt
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1199 (1948).
164. Id. at 4433, II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TIE LABOR MANAOEMENT RttA-
TIONS AT, 1947, at 1200 (1948).
165. The Court noted that "Senator Ball cited numerous examples of organizing drives
characterized by threats against unorganized workers of violence, job reprisals and such re-
pressive assertions as that double initiation fees would be charged those who delayed joining
the union." 362 U.S. at 286.
166. "Senator Ball gave numerous examples of the kind of union conduct the amend-
ment was to cover. Each one related to union conduct during organizational campaigns,
Senator Ball reiterated this purpose several times thereafter, including remarks added after the
passage of the amendment." 388 U.S. at 186-87.
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tion 8(a), which prevents an employer from interfering with [later
deleted] or restraining employees in the exercise of their rights.," 67 Yet
Senator Smith goes on to state that "[t]he pending measure is de-
signed to protect employees in their freedom to decide whether or not
they desire to join labor organizations, to prevent them from being re-
strained or coerced.' '168  The Court in Allis-Chalmers analyzed Sena-
tor Smith's passage as one that "echoed this purpose" of Senator
Ball's, which the Court described thus: "The consistent thrust of his ar-
guments was the necessity of controlling union conduct in organiza-
tional campaigns. '
69
Finally, in Bernhard-Altmann, the Court pointed generally to cer-
tain comments of Senator Taft during the debates. At one point in
his comments Senator Taft made the statement that "all that is at-
tempted is to apply the same provision [8(a)(1)] with exact equality
to labor unions."170  Elsewhere in the same statement, however, Sen-
ator Taft declared:
The Senator says it will slow up organizational drives. It will slow up
organizational drives only if they are accompanied by threats and coer-
cion. The cease-and-desist order will be directed against the use of
threats and coercion. It will not be directed against the use of propa-
ganda or the use of persuasion, or against the use of any of the other
peaceful methods of organizing employees.1
7 1
In the same general colloquy Senator Taft gave examples of the kind
of employer conduct that he understood had been proscribed by sec-
tion 8(a)(1). The examples were of threats to discharge, reduce the
wage of, or punish employees to prevent their joining a union, as well
as threats of violence.1 72  Senator Taft then gave as analogous ex-
amples of union conduct covered by the amendment, threats of bodily
harm and economic coercion, and violent, mass picketing that bars
employees from work. 7
3
167. 93 CONG. REc. 4435 (1947), reprinted in 11 NLRB. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF T1lE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1204 (1948).
168. Id.
169. 388 U.S. at 187-88.
170. 93 CONG. REc. 4436 (1947), reprinted in II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1207 (1948).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 4435-36, II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LBoR MANAGEIE!NT
RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1205 (1948).
173. Id., II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TlE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
AcT, 1947, at 1205-06 (1948). Senator Taft also stated:
The effect of the pending amendment is that the Board may call the union before them.
exactly as it has called the employer, and say, "Here are the rules of the game. You
must cease and desist from coercing and restraining the employees who w'ant to work
ftom going to work and earning the money which they are entitled to eam." The
Board may say, "You can persuade them; you can put up signs, you can conduct any
form of propaganda you want to in order to persuade them, but you cannot, by threat
of force or threat of economic reprisal, prevent them from exercising their right to
work." As I see it, that is the effect of the amendment.
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The Court in Curtis Brothers and in Allis-Chalmers seems to have
squarely rejected the proposition so generally stated in Bernhard-
Altmann that the reach of section 8(b)(1)(A) is coextensive with that
of section 8(a)(1). Thus, in Curtis Brothers the Court stated:
It is true that here and there in the record of the debates there are iso-
lated references to instances of conduct which might suggest a broader
reach of the amendment. . . . But they appear more as aside in a de-
bate, the central theme of which was not the curtailment of the right
peacefully to strike, except as provided in § 8(b)(4), but the elimination of
the use of repressive tactics bordering on violence or involving particu-
larized threats of economic reprisal. 174
And in Allis-Chalmers the Court stated:
It is true that there are references in the Senate debate on § 8(b)(l)(A)
to an intent to impose the same prohibitions on unions that applied to
employers as regards restraint and coercion of employees in their exer-
cise of § 7 rights. However apposite this parallel might be when applied
to organizational tactics, it clearly is inapplicable to the relationship of a
union member to his own union.' 5
Curtis Brothers seems to have left in its wake a host of unresolved
questions concerning the scope and meaning of section 8(b)(1)(A).
Included among these is the extent to which section 8(b)(1)(A) is to be
limited to a narrow class of repressive conduct. Resolution of these
questions is fundamental to the eventual determination of the validity
of Miranda Fuel.
V. CONCLUSION
National labor policy has been founded on the concept that the
collective economic strength of employees acting through their major-
ity representative is the most effective means of promoting collective
bargaining. Unions were thereby vested with substantial power to or-
der relations between employer and employee. Indeed, as discussed
earlier, it was because of this power that the courts fashioned the
duty of fair representation enforceable in the courts.
The judicial doctrine of the duty of fair representation evolved
Id. at 4436, II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TIlE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AT,
1947, at 1206 (1948). Senator Taft stated at another point:
Mr. President, I can see nothing in the pending measure which, as suggested by the Sen-
ator from Oregon, would in some way outlaw strikes. It would outlaw threats against
employees. It would not outlaw anybody striking who wanted to strike. It would not
prevent anyone using the strike in a legitimate way, conducting peaceful picketing, Cr
employing persuasion. All it would do would be to outlaw such restraint and coercion
as would prevent people from going to work if they wished to go to work.
Id., II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947,
at 1207 (1948). See also Senator Taft's remarks, id. at 4021, 4023, 4024, II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1025, 1029, 1030 (1948).
174. 362 U.S. at 286-87.
175. 388 U.S. at 190-91.
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as protection for the employee against the improper exercise by a
union of its representative role. The doctrine was known when the
Taft-Hartley amendments were being considered, yet the legislative
history is devoid of any references to the doctrine, much less to any
indication that the doctrine was to be incorporated into the unfair
labor practice provisions of the Act. 76  When Congress in 1959 deter-
mined that employees required additional protection against union ex-
cesses, Congress enacted the Landrum-Griffin amendments containing
a comprehensive regulation of internal affairs in the area of relations
between unions and employees.17 Thereafter when Congress deter-
mined that employees required additional protection against union
acts of racial and other invidious discrimination in employment, Con-
gress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' The radia-
tions of Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization179 suggest that the Board tread carefully in areas covered
by Title VII and committed to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the courts.
It is not here suggested as a general principle that federal labor
policy endorses the right of a union to freely engage in arbitrary,
capricious, or discriminatory conduct of any dimension. Nor is it
suggested that the internal union affairs concept under the section
8(b)(1)(A) proviso, the Landrum-Griffin Act, or Title VII encompass or
delimit all of the types of conduct now proscribed by the Board un-
der Miranda Fuel What is suggested is that Congress has been both
cautious and specific when it has undertaken to regulate union con-
duct, particularly union-employee relationships, as well as when it has
undertaken to regulate racial and other invidious discrimination. There
would thus seem to be a substantial and legitimate question concern-
ing the propriety of the Board's conversion of section 8(b)(1)(A) and
(2) into the comprehensive code of union regulation herein described.
"It may be that the tactics used here deserve condemnation, but this
176. See Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VaLj. L REv. 151, 172 (1957).
177. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L No.86-257,73
Stat. 519. The Supreme Court outlined the significance of these amendments as follows:
The 1959 provisions are significant for still another reason. We have seen that the only
indication in the debates over § 8(b)(1)(A) of a reach beyond organizational tactics
which restrain or coerce nonmembers was Senator Taft's concern with arbitrary and
undemocratic union leadership. The 1959 amendments are addressed to that concern.
The kind of regulation of internal union affairs which Senator Taft said protected
stockholders of a corporation, and made necessary a "right of protest against arbitrary
powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders," is embodied
in the 1959 Act. The requirements of adherence to democratic principles, fair proce-
dures and freedom of speech apply to the election of union officials and extend into all
aspects of union affairs.
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 194-95. See generally Cox, Internal Affairs of
Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MicH. L REv. 819 (1960).
178. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
179. 420 U.S. 50 (1975); see note 16 supra.
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would not justify attempting to pour that condemnation into a vessel
not designated to hold it."'O A more specific congressional charter
would seem appropriate in this sensitive area.
180. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 496 (1960). Speaking for
the majority in Insurance Agents', Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
It is one thing to say that the Board has been afforded flexibility to determine, for ex-
ample, whether an employer's disciplinary action taken against specific workers is per-
missible or not, or whether a party's conduct at the bargaining table evidences a real
desire to come into agreement. The statute in such area clearly poses the problem
to the Board for its solution. . . . It is quite another matter, however, to say that the
Board has been afforded flexibility in picking and choosing which economic devices
of labor and management shall be branded as unlawful. Congress has been rather
specific when it has come to outlaw particular economic weapons on the part of unions,
...But it is clear to us that the Board needs a more specific charter . . . before It
can add to the Act's prohibitions here.
Id. at 498-99.
